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BJjfeô aphic Senrtces Biajx^
39%«ft#sna«jnSm>t’t Osaf*a iMano K1A0N4
ites servæes b*ta3ij<a}ihit̂ tn»s
wWmHwh*]C%A*a lC»4jfiii1 K1A0N4
The author has granted an 
Irrévocable non-excluslve licence 
allowing the Natonal Library of 
Canada to reproduce, loan, 
distribute or sell copies of 
his/her thesis by any means and 
in any form or format, making 
this thesis available ô Interested 
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ABSTRACT
Rt:c:YCÜNG 1 HE DEBT CRISIS; THE WEST'S 
STRATEGIC RESPONSE TO THE DEBT CRISIS
This *)Ksis attempts to examine the (kbt cm» from a poHtka! and institutional 
perspective. I Jsing the f r̂fiiical-ceomMiiy ap|Htrach it restais that the West’s rc^km  
to tte  cris» in mtcmatkmal jaymcnls îm  iwi been an ad Wc process of ”miKidIii^ 
through". Rather, it has been a carcfuliy crafted respmwe that has «naWently fart 
the interests rrf the tanking community al%ml of tk»c of the debtor a n m tr^  The 
objective of th» strategy has teen to staWîiaæ tte  mtematmnal creditor tenks tty 
recycling LDCs’ new loans back to the banks in the form of interest payments from 
debtor countries. In this way debts are serviced on time and banks avoid any major 
disnjpthms to their stock valtws or p r t#  margins.
I have chosen the Banker and Brady plans and the International Monetary 
bund to demni»irate tte nnrans by which tte  American have atiem^ned to enfwcc 
iteir tebt containment strategy. T te ^ k e r  attd Brstty {^ns were dipkimatk 
measures to renew vofuniary kiKhng to U X ’s through stabilizing ea^mjtnies and 
sJuiring tte bunten trf new lending between officia! and private lending institutions. 
Tte IMPs efforts to tKHtnalûæ and stabiliK relations between debim countries and 
tteir creditor banks have been an intrinsic part of the W«t*s overall effort to 
maintain tte  flow of new capital to tte  debtor countries.
In conclusion, 1 st^gest tte t tebi ami interest rate reductbn must tecmt» the 
primary objective in tte West's efforts to stabilize Third w o ^  deb». If it &*es ik«, 
tte economfcs of the ttebtor countries will continue to errale as wüi their pcojrfcs' 




Thott^ mtKh has been written tm the debt criss, few Mi studies hase pow 
beÿoisï its finawrial and ecomimk nspectv As a result many wsnks are
rmnowly focuts^ ami irrelevant to the realities involved in the management ami 
resolution of the international debt erWs. However, this situation shows signs of 
chatting. A numlwr of authors have now begun to examine tN; interaetâm of the 
political and imtitmtonal aspects of Third wirrkJ itebt with its ectrmmtrc and hmim ial 
cUn^nsioier, Thss emerging body of literature has dealt with such topics as the 
political and economic impact of external debts on Third world countries, the politics 
trf ret^gotm^irB and tlw role of multilateral organhations in the development 
and staUliaitkm of the ^ b t  ersls.* Becatse œ miKh of ths literature is new. It has 
not yet devek^xd into a s t^ h s tk a t^  hmfy of kmjwfcd^. This is particularly true 
fOT tte re%areh ttet hat been ttorw on tte  Western respome to Third rwrrkl debt. 
Mo amtec tes as yet prodded a defwitlve aconmt td* how and why Wcsti m nat^ms
‘ Vteid K. A g«w A  flfrEaMATOaiAL p a r  t hreats bargainimg am< ^ »
CREOTIPaSANDICTrraiSlMTHEWBffS Berkky, e n te n te  1%7, MUes Kshkr {ed.>.lU£
t'haca Akw V<^ nnmell tJn»e«ttv P?es&. tWfc. ICaren 
U o^sn . *D^^oe WaM Sreet: Ftu^m  Fmsnoe* PnttPmN MX.KY St^oKr. l%3. la ^ s  A 
2^%S. "R^uWmy Aspeca ot Ae WdrW Debt Protteæ* CATO JOURNAL, Vtd. 4, i m  
J a ^  RodttelL THE DA!«S OF THF lATIW AMRRKIA AND THF. ICTT
CBIS& Lmaloft: Latin Anxrkao ftneau. 1988
ami tmiiiutinns have rcsptrmted to the cmts in intematioflal payirents. Most wiitcfs 
have chn«:n to rely on tkscripthms, rather than anafysis, wten discussing <klH 
rene^utathins at^ as a result have never invest^tcd the cofu^tenckts timt um ^he 
all debt rerufgotiatHrns, The work of Stephanie Griffith-Joncs and Osvaldo Sunkel 
is a case in point. In their work, atrf Itevek^ingn! Crisa^ALLaim Aaarka; 
limi of an they descriN; tîw teader^ip role assumed by creditor
governments, central banks amJ multilateral organkatbns as one of the main 
structural features of Western management of Third world d e b t s N o  mention B 
nutde of tin: tactics adt^ted by these actors to contain international debt, tl^ extent 
to which they Iwvc ctxjrdinatcd their efforts, or tin: reasons for their mutual 
cooperation.
Sunkel and Griffith-Jones view tla* provsbn of involuntary jnivate terming 
to debtor countries as the second major element in the West’s resportre to Third 
worki debts. While they describe a number of « a m p ^  of forred tending to ttebtor 
countries they faU to eranum; how involuntary tendh^ relates to the overall respoiBC 
of Western nations and institutions to the debt crisis. Furthermore, they neglect to 
usk fcy wtet RumiB tW banks have been forced into involuntary teiKling and who has 
bene fitted from this policy.
" Saqrii3flteOriffithdmiesaiidQw^SuriteLD EBrr^q>!^V Fir»>MHMTrglSBSlN 
LATIN AWERK;A;THEENP0FAN1LL1^3N. New Yt%k Ctereodtm Press. 1986:111
Marko Mflivop^’s book T he Pete RescheOuling Pnicc»". timnicd 
pnmarOy to camming the ^m sis erf the debt crisis and Us ctinseqi^nces tin deNm 
countrks, tkws attempt an ana^rm the polities of debt rescheduling/ MilUojcsi*-. 
in examining the differences between pre- and post-l%iZ stmrreign debt 
renegmrntkn», «NKWcd that between 1%2 and 1984 three factiws char^ztcriyed the 
West’s MiWhng trf LDCs’ ttebts; the size ami occurrence of brkJging loans, 
invoJvciïKiit of 11» IMF in coordinating deN negotiations and suj^dying of high- 
^jmhttormlity, IMF kwr* to ttebtc»’ countries.'* Milivo^vic’s cnnclmdon tiocs not 
atWrMS tl» mtef'felattoashipi between these three as^»cts of debt management. I-m 
example, he docs not examine the imponant role of bridging loans to the process of 
debt renegotiattons, timefy servicing of toreigt debts and the crcatkm and ini{M»itam 
of structural sdjustii»fti prt^raros. Nor dtws he reveal how these three factors w re 
enfomd nor w ^ l» r  t i ^  arc pan of an ad htxi or uarrdireited policy resprnse to 
ÛW prtrt^m of Thtfd world tklns. MiMvt^vk also ignmes ite kst» of il» kgiiimacy 
of state or multtkteral organaations involving themselves in the financial affairs ol 
Kwefe%n nstkms.
Ben^mmi J. Q ^ n ’s, in his work, "A Global Chapter IT . faife, like iromy other 
authors, to fuSy develop the implications of his conclusions on the Western response
19S5
M alm  M tfeaÿ v k  TH E DEBT R l LING PROCKSS. New York: St. M artin's Prcst,
* 57-63
u> the debi cmjs. He implies that the tntematfonal croütt» banks and tlwir home 
^jvemmenis have conspired to pul concern for the «Kindness trf ftnancW hstitutkms 
above all other comWcrattom in the resolution of the ttebt crisêt.  ̂ Cohen kfentiffcs 
the United States government, amJ laq^ American commcrcml banls as the 
figures in this conspiracy * Foremc»t amoi^ this calaJ arc, according to Cohen, d a  
Department of tta Treasury, Federal R ^ rv e  Bwrd and m a ^  moray-oentrc Immks 
of New York, Chka^i and Califonta-’ Where Cohen’s conchmton falters s  in its 
failure to identic how ilase groups have ccxtrdinated their activities and their impact 
on debt rencgtKiaikin agreements. Rather than acUrcss these questions, Iw n%re^ 
restates soiw of tk; weU-wum argvin^nts on stnRtura! ac^mtment pn^gran» and 
criticizes their costs in huimn a ml mKwrnic tcm»,
Studks that attempt detolkd exammaikins of the W ^tem r% por^ to tl% 
debt crise arc often diminished a reliatKc on only one or two case studi» for their
cimdiskms. For exampk, Ehnar Abater’s emmmation of the Meskan debt 
leiargmiaiiom in ami J9S3 lead him to coitoUuk: that the fwm of crfes
manage ment employed by Western officials was "wholly in the interests of leading
’ Benjamin J. Cohen. "A Globa! Chapter 11' FOREIGN POUCY. Summer. 1989:118
*’ ÏB1D 
’ IBID
grmips ta tJte Wmotataæd countries" * Because Abater’s rcliami? on iwity tta* 
Medcan exampk t» was utmbk to a&ireia a numtaer questions that icquire a 
bnmder perspective to ai»wer, such as who these "kaUing groups" where, their 
ot^ciives and what influence they have had on other debt renegtniaikms.
Jackie Roddick’s conclusions on Western management of the debt crisis are 
aiso weaimned 8 rehance on onfy one case study. She states that the esse raze of 
the R ea^n admmkuratkin's aj^Tnxich to ita; Mexican resctx was to st&iain the flow 
of taterest paynænts in order to avoid a "colUtf^ of confuknce" in tte micrnatkmal 
teidcing s y s t ^ T b s  was achieved by rescheduling Mexico’s debts and enforcing 
an IMF-spotBt^ed adjtatment pro^m,*® A vital part of this afqjrtstch. acctmhtig 
to Roddkk, was to coordinate the auttetrity and financial power of tte International 
Monetary Fuiuî, with that of the U.S. Treasury amJ U5. Federal Reserve Hoard.** 
CbmNntag tteir cRdrts, t i^ e  three tnstitutkms m^ked to enforce Western ob^clives 
OB rec^ktuant crethtor bankers and ttebtor governments. Roddkk’s conclusiom. fails 
to mfdiess some of tte  sans hmdamental questktm that are left unanswered by so 
many studtes, such as tew ttetK bodtes tet% coordinated their efforis, what their
* Eteg Abater a  ^  THE fPVeSIX Q E T m m m i i S ;  A TQ m E J Q tm




i)h^ctî¥cs arc and ibc degree fo whkh they have infh*nced subsequent érfn 
rc«:heUulings.
For writers wto believe tl% West has pursued a ojordinated aM united 
respond to ilw ttebt crisis, ilwrc still exfeis d^agreement over wiæther the atj^tmtnxnt 
of tteWor’s cconomtes or stabiloatkat of the oeditor tmnks hm been titt pntmiy 
objectives of ttebt nmna^meitt. Pedm-Pabio KiKajftski and WBteni A. Eshk%e 
represent tfw tm» t^rposii^ views in thés ttelmtc. Kuczynskl «mtcnife that sh%e tlw 
Mexican rescue effort of 19H2 the West’s prime objective has been to impose 
austerity measure in debtor countries, He argues that Western officiais justify 
iidjieitnutni measures on the grtruitds that an imminent global eatnomtc rwoveiy wiH 
allow reformed economics to decrease their external debts and return to credit* 
worthiness in 3 to 5 years.Kuczynski concludes that these adjustment measures 
are the most successful and effective aspect of Western management of the debt
creis.*^
William A. Eskridge asserts that the management of Third world debts by the 
creditor banks, Inteniatks»! Mor%mry Fund, Bank for International Sctttei^oa, 
U JS. gowmment atW other Western itatiotm hmt been designed to % st and fommst"




keep moiwy into tfctHor onm tda K) as to enahk the servicmg of enterna!
debts mW mvoW a t^nptiom  of the creditor hanks.*' The underhtnp
asumptton of the s tr a i^ ,  acmrding to EskrnJge, is that the debt crisis is a crisis of 
Uqukbty and the suf^^ông of interim financing will provide ikbtor countries with the 
opportunity to increase their exports, revive their domestic ccononues and acquire 
tïw ftae i^  currettcy i%etW to service tfeir debts.**' The adoption of IMI 
ats%nty W seen Eskridge as a means to encowrai^ and supprn these
t^vefoprxnt in ilw ntaJium-term.*^
In contrœsi to authors such as Eskridge ami Kuczyitski are those writers wkr 
daim that the West has never "managed” the crisis. They argue that Western 
r^XNKC has been "ad hoc" and a process of "muddling through". Sidney Dell, a 
Senmr FeUtw at the United Natmn’s Institute for Training ami Research, states that 
there been a compictmus alienee of any real principles of debt relief displayed 
ly the mtcnuttKmnI actors invcdved in the debt cr»is. Comequcntly. no minimum 
smmWttb of debt rcHcf Ms ever bœn created.*** He Mlievcs that opjxirtimiites for 
^ n e ra fe ^  a p p * o ^ ^  to debt mana^ir«nt have not arisen because Western
^  Wmrna K  E s b ^  PAPKE JÛJONO THE MmaPK:E: THE POIJTTCAL AND
OT THE PfTËRNAnQNAL DEBT CRK& Leungton. Ma».: 
LaoJ^m  BotAs, 1965:155*156.
** mrk%e!56
m n
*® Sidney DeB. *Crisa Msnagcœctit and llw iotemarbnsl Deo: Probkm TNTlrRNATKWAi. 
JPUBWALrn X L . N a 4, A%uA 1985:669
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(mritutiuns have dealt with each debtor country on m casc-by-casc basis, which 
precludes the application of standardized principles of debt relief.
Dell’s conclusmm arse, in part, &om an ittabfltty to vkw the mamgemcm oi 
international tfcbt in its entirety. He W s to rcalôæ that the 
is only oiw aspect of a much l a ^ r  ttebt containn^nt strategy tMt à  to put
Western interests above those of the debtor countries, Dell, like many writers 
igmires, the fact that despite the tailoring of renegotiation aiW adjtmmem packages 
to debtors’ nfctb, debt rescheduling agreertKnts have an umterlytng onsæterKy. 
None of the rescheduling p ic k a ^  address debtors’ need for debt and interest rate 
rcductwns. fkbt servkir^ probtems arc consstently relieved mcreWng private 
and public finaiKing to indebted LDC’s and fcMCing debtor countries to atkipt IMF- 
supported adjiKiment prc^m s. No suggestion s  made fm* principe or interest rate 
reductions, Lastfy, calls for tte  estabiishrtKnt of an intematknml debt facility thioi^h 
which to process Third worhJ debts have been repeatedly dkmissMi Western 
govemnwnts. It is naive of Deli and others like him to si^ggest ttet Western nations 
wouki not have devked standardized pnxedures, let alone a ttetailed aj^nda, ftw 
dealing with LDCs' extenral ctebts.
The qtntstiofts rased in tte  f b r ^ ± ^  literature review provides the omaTl 
framework for this thesm. The fira issue to be athhessed s  a futeamentaj 
wtetter or ik» Western lattor», in ^ockricm with mtcrtmlhmal G tm n^
n
instimtk»», have (kvi^d a strategy for n^ttaining Third wtwW debt. This thesis 
(^masdrates that W ^em  mtkms, aka^ with tk; Iniematkmai Miweiaty Fund, have 
ti^Kd tkvrnal a strategy for the statnHzatkm of intematktnal debts, one that has kid 
a cmWstent set of cdt^ctives. examinât fon trf the Briufy mu! Rikcr phiiB will 
{m>ve that forenmst anmi^ tWse (^^ecthrs has been the siabilbtaikm irf the 
mternatkmal bankh^ (immunity through tW recycling of ttew cotmncrcml credit from 
tite batdts to the tiakbted countrtM and back to the hanks in the form of interest 
{^menk.
T*te as^m^rtton of an ordtesirated Wi^tern resjHinse to Third worW debts 
r a ^  the scœnd questbn that will be dealt with in thb thesis. The questkm is, what 
has been the nmtrvadrtg fiwcc behiixl the West’s united response to the problem of 
Third world debt? I prove that Western unity stems from a shared desire to uphold 
tite soundmas of the internatfonal banku^ community and the global ftnanciai system 
as a whole and American leadership from Western counties and banks’ willingness 
to forego ilm role in favour of the mtKh more experienced Americans.
The next issue to be addrcssc ’ is the one most often neglected in the 
literature, lasw W  tW West etrformi ie strategy for the containment of Third muW 
debts? My response is that the International Monetary Fund has become one of the 
chkf næaj» th ixn^ whkh W^tern objecth^ for debt management have l%cn 
reah s^  Siitee tlœ deot criss b e ^  in the Furai has taken a nundxtr of 
t^rrecetfent^ meastues to nonr^h» reklfor» between kinks and indcNed
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iteve]i>{Mn| coujjtries and in the procas fc»tcr an increase tevcl of comnwrdaJ 
tending to dcvetoping countrks.
AJ) of these êsws wjU be examôKd within the thtxnttteal framework of 
poîiiKal-ecomnny. The methodology of polhteai-eoomng' ê  partwufarfy weB-«rited 
to an elimination of the jmhtkal araJ écornante aspect of tetenmtionaî debt. It 
provides the umter^'ng pnncipte that polittes etui ecmuHtiks arc mulimify 
interdependent, something that is %veh borne out the debt crtes. No 6tmndal 
demions taken in reganls to U X h' exterW deWs are witlmut their ptditteai 
impJteatkîns. Nor arc any major debt tescheduH^ aoKtmplteted witWut the 
oxjperatmn of pt^ttea] inaitutkms.
TTw concept of power anumg poMticaJ-economisis is ;mrttewter relevant to a 
study of Western containment of dcvciopag aruntiy debt, ^litteaf-ecooomists argue 
that state and institutional power emerges wi^n indmduab and gmupt r^ U »  that 
united, rather ikm mdivhiuai sctkm, is sune conducive to tl% achievemeni of 
conuiKtn gmiis. Thk realizatkm a then reinfbrm! by muttml beliefs and conmton 
pilitteai and et^snomlc interests. In the iniematioim] arena kn^tcrm  coof«raiioa 
between states and institutions tteprmk heat% on a slmKd obli^tim  to protea an 
hteoh^teal aitel/tn' nmral crœd ^ i m t  a common tiueat or eneny. Cooperation 
between states and imthuttom, wttether on tte ttetkmal w  internatknml stage; 
event^dly p ^ te s  to the 6me a perron w  iisthutton tte t tak»  romnmW to t& m  a 
muted respmse to exterml c h a i^  m  diseqmBmum. Eventtmlfy ths entity
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auihwiiy aiW devek^ a reskiual wmimm pur^xmr, usualk 
of ntitttaiy, ^oncnnk or political action a^ n s i a common fi>c.
Tlutnighout the debt crm» the abcnnementtnned ideas on state and tmtiiutional 
power bat* been teahKd on an international smk. A high level coo^ratkm has 
developed among creditor governments and institutions as a result of their realization 
that a sOBte^ agereda for (kbt management can onfy 1% achieved through joint 
ac^m ratîttr tl®n mdivtdual Initbtives. The axtperatiiMi of Western naiHMts in the 
face of potential stnrere^ tfcfaults Ms been strengthened by a cirmmtm kieakigy 
ba%d on capital^ pnncipks and a shared obligaimn to protect the free fkrw of 
capital and emure tMt the interrmtionai Mnks aiai the global cnpitaimt q^em are 
nmintained in j^oper working onter.
The United States, as anticipated tq? tfw tenants of jxîittàal-econoniy, has 
en*rfcd as the kWing force anwng Western respondents to the debt crsis. It has 
used ibs i^Ktige aiW ecommtic power to direct debt management to ihrf
alimst exdt^ve bemrfit of Western mttmt» and institutions. I'M creation and 
pnmKttktn the Bsirer a«f Brady plans narked the imtitutromilÉüonm of America’s 
m ratc^ cmttrol ovm- management of the debt créa and rcveated the mcam by which 
it was to be achieved.
The relationship between the state and business interests has been defined by 
a number of pojjtical-economisi as a symbiotic one, in which the modern corporation 
s  racked m M eam>my that b  controlled by tM state. This alliance is reinftwced
14
shared kka k^cs  and economic objectives, both of whteh am  kW  to joint pofitks! 
amJ ^otmmk aakm.
Symbiosis is an apt description of the relationship that has developed between 
states anJ btsim^es invWv^ in the mai^^mem aS LDCs' external (kbts. 
Inieimimnal imnks are an imegm! pan trf the intenatknml Rnmtwml system tlmt é  
based upon am) guided tin: polkks of il» major WwtrW natknm. Theiefore, in 
the face of a major ifaeat to intematkHtal finance such as tl% ttebt créé, Wetem 
^wemmems and banks have collaborate) in onter to naintam tlx  system. Their 
ciKjperative alliance has been furthered by a slmred concern for the naintenarw of 
the intemaifaoai capitalét ^ te m  and a dsire to etsime the stability of of its 
nuBt important etements, the internatknal Imnking community.
The basic objective of this thesis is to present an analysis of the debt crisis 
that differs from conventional approaches in that it earn ing  tte  pohtteal aiK) 
htsthutkmal aspects of the arsis, ratter than jtstt its fitmiKtel and ecoacmtic 
dimenstons. T te facta of attentkm wili te  on tte  West’s strategte respotee to Ae 
problem of Thkd world (telH. A respnse ttet W  been impeted cowerw tte  
intenmtMMml bankn% commuttity am) mtbieved th n n ^  pohttcal ami u^ittkbtml 
ttwam. Overall, thm ttesis wih ttemmtstrate ttet tte  debt crh^ in not mmplÿ a mattm- 
of (^itom k and financial aWrs. Bm ratter, a vmy ccnnples event, w te»  knpmn 
has ttmclw) upon tte  ewmmte, f im i^ l  am) poRteal affairs of cmfinn' aW dtdttm 
coumrtes, multifateml hetituficnB am) mtenwAaml cretfitor bat&s.
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CHAPTER!; WESI^RN UNITY AND AMERICAN 
I£AD£RSmP IN TOE FACE OF 
TOE DEBT CRISIS
Mexico's announcement in August of 1982 that is was unable to service its 
foreign debts unleashed a torrent of speculation over the jxitenlialty disastrous 
coioequences of widespread sovereign defaults. Because of this intense concern 
there arose among creditor governments and institutions a willingmrss to cixvperate 
that eventually lead to the United States leading the clTon to stabilize the Third 
world's payments crhk.
Iniltaliy, the gravest concern was directed towards the stability of the private 
creditor banks. Just two months prior to Mexico’s announcement, bank claims on 
developing countries stood at $268.3 biUkm.^ The largest sovereign debtors were 
in Latin American, with Argentina, Brazil and Mexico owning the most, at 
respectively $25,3 bfllion, $55.3 billion and $64.4 billkm.^' All ctrrobined, this 
amounted to 83.6% of the total capital of all the 171 major international banks that 
reported to the Bank for International Settlements.^ If all 115 non-oil producing 
debtor countries bad defaulted within one year of Mexico's announcement these
“  Qtgfca Bm«er and Jana  Bl Huriock, SOVEREIGN DEBT: RECENT REGULATORY 
AVr> t FVPrNO ISSUES and  practices. New York: Law and Bu&inew.lncVB&reourl Brace 
JovmovkK 1983:234, Table 11
”  Brower and Hurtock 234. Table 111
® Brower and Huriock 234. Table II, 240.
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hanks wouW have imd a com tm ^ defkii of S27J biBton and b o n  forced into 
insohwncy.^
Amerkan banks stood to fose the mcst from wkfos}»ead scvere%o defowhs. 
TTwy twUJ 3&7% of the totaî debts of tite <fovek^A% wwW, amf t m r ^ d  an 
a^rmge of 4 ^  of Latin Amerka’s foans, ««npsred to tte  Japam ^' 10% ami tte  
Buropeam ate  Caimdians’ combined 48%.^ The nmc tor^tst American bonks 
held S3Ü.5 billion in Argentinean, Brazilian a te  Mexican debts, amounting to 112.5% 
of their total capital.^ Tte man fifteen krgest An^rican tenks aho 81.1% of 
tteir capital inwsicd in kKn% to Mertûto, a te  A r^ tk m .^  T te teaks' 
positkm was even more precarious tte  fact that tenknt Ancæikan baoldi^ 
regiBatiom stipukted that teaks had to Mt asitk only 1% of their totol assets as a 
provisiofl a ^ W  tkbtor ttefouits.^ Q n^uentfy , tenks such as Gtilmnk hte an 
expowre of 510 hdlfon m Sooth Anwrkan, but onh' $680 million in their loan less
^  Jasas tertb et al The htematkmal Debt OksK Rhmork % Re^lhy KHJRNAL OF 
SOCIA L g a J l l C ALA IO?EQ O t« M C S n f f l ^  VoL9. No.A 1984:461.
^  T te  Rducuutt Gw& Jqan ate tte Late A n^ksi Debt Crass
K W RN A LW  LATIN AMERICAN SltH aE R  Vd.22. P te  t, February 199&A
^  Brower ate HurWck 238.
^  Brower mid Hmlock 240.
^ Mffiw^29.
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iwcivcs.^ In contrast Swiss banks were forced to set aside 5% of their capita!, 
while 2-3 % m a  «mskkred the twrm in tl« test of Europe.^
Official concerns over bank st*ency were intensified by the threat of mass 
witMraw^ fhmi cmhmr Imnks. Anætkan bankers were ameertW that a kne 
in fomtt»- con&fonec would to a radt of deposilw witWmwab, pinkuturfy by 
Wgc œrporatksis wlK% subsfoni^l ifopcstfô oouW 1% whWmwn in tl» sf^ice of it 
fow bmirs. FurtWnnwc, US. tanking regulations stipulate tlmt American Ninks 
publish a repmi erf their profits every three mtmtN, thus making them [mnkuttrfy 
vuhwrraWe to public perœpifom about their finara’iaJ viability. I-or all creditor banks, 
sa le  withdrawal aiul the resultant depreciation of stuck vatmrs would serknady 
ermfo the creditor tanks' capital base ami assets to capital ratiez
Covenmmnt and tanking oRkzmb in the industrialized ««wld were well aware 
tlmt a kKC in the base trf their intematfanal banks, whether due to debt
repudiations, interruptions in interest payments or large-sea ie depositor withdrawals, 
would serfous etsnunnk comeqwnce. Wglmm Oiim ettinmted that a ikcllne 
d  #  b ^ m  m tmak caf^al, caus«l ly oim year's lose trf imrome from Brazilkm, 




[oajs mmwWiqg S160 Mikm, ÜKTclÿ nxliKh^ *%« amcmnt of
kndi:% capital evaiWbk to r^3 tW  Wmht, ami WvWual o n m i^ rs .^
n% retreat of mai^ t^nks from tl% Third worW kmln% market w u am w ^ 
rcasfMt fm o ffk^  com»nL In the U&nmiy*amBw"ootIWr"bafy(a, were extreme^ 
rehKtani to p a n k ^ te  ht sofvere^ ikW resd » ih ^ t^  ami n^mitdngs. T b^  
pcferred to sefl crff tlxir Third wmW tlx KOoiNhtry nmAm and coventrate
tlxir efforts on «msmtxr and btsiixss kn#%  and pmvhSng t^vki»  pievknsfy 
nwrmpoWzcd by investment bankers, brokerage homes, om navc and real 
mtate fimss.̂ * In cmtffast, the lar^  mteimtktnal anhm r Ixnks were firaify 
comtnttted to tte  Tfahd wt*kl kndh% nxrket. To be otixrwhe wouW have 
endai^red rkbtw eountiies' ability to servke then debts, lowered banla' prtÆt and 
stock values and furtlxr eroded their available lemKng rapital.
Once tlx htitW concerm over severe^ ttefeults had subskkd, oSkiaW m the 
WustrWized W et, part^brfy in tlx US^ b ^ m  to rehze that a wkksf^ead 
juments okW wotAl lave x rkns political aiul ecotKMntc coiweqixnces for the 
MKhÊ riaihcnl workt Harsh ad^ustnxm ^ a n s v s  in tkbmr countrks co i^  cause tlx 
overtimow of newfy ekcW  Latin American gwwmnxnts ami tlxtr relèvement by
^  W m uaC he^n flE R N A ^ IA L  Da r n  SY^nSMKRKK AND M K K T fR E S P Œ ^ 
Cambrid^, Mass: MÎT Press, 19S4J 8
Uiuxd &Mes.CEM^e»i{oïse.Crayiâtee on Afi^hs. Pttfmim G  OF
INATK^ALt^gr. Waiteifion.D.C,;GownTiroKUPui^a^»aC^5ce. At^iat i MMI&MI84
:8b
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r i^ l  or kA-wkg extrema^ Wihw stffl. in tte eyei of Western governments ami 
batten , iras the jmspect dvfUan ̂ nwtnments rcpWiating, ettter fulfy or pania&. 
their external debts or demanding more lenient terns for the rcfinaneing and 
Iteir sovereign debts.
T te jHOspect of pt^itkal upteavats in Latin Anurrica wi» of a far greater 
ONKem m ite  A s^rksm  tteo tteg- European, Canadian or ja^mnese niiha. l.min 
Asurrka im  pea* soauigic itopcntance for tte United S ta i^  Ar^ dbaxiptkm in its 
poStkal stabdity or utematHxml foments threatciwU to sour relations between tte 
two areas and force a confrontation over domestic and mtematmnal interests. Also, 
Amerkan fmbtkal fteied that any lar^-scale political or ecoimmic déruptâm in 
M ec^  would Read to a tidai wn%% of imm^rants ami illegal drup acn%s tte 
Mex^uvAnmkan tender.^ Consequent^, many politicians felt that unless some 
benefit w œ  fcnrtteoaiing to tte  Latin Aiteraans for their emmmte sacrdkes, there 
was tte  pt»sW% ttet Iteir lecem gah» tmrards democracy and economic 
mfjiamrnnt wcmki be k»i.^
T te A n a r^n s  were mjtaSy dktres%d over tte pMential im;%ci of the 
p^roette crkW tm tteir export a te  bbour narkets. T te tebtm’ countnes' polky of
^  United Statei.Coogfen-How.Com}Bittec on Banking. Finance and Urban AlTairs. 
Subcommittee cm Inlcmxtjonal Dcvekjprneni Instnulions, Finance, Trade and Monetary Policy 
THIRD w n R ID  DEBT L g îS lA T IO R  Washington, DC: Govcmroenl Puhlkalkms Ofto. 
March 12.18,19 «sd 2a 1986:9097.
^  Umted StstfikQmfrasJ1ouse.Comraittec on Foreign Affairs. August 1,8,1^:58.
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servkmg their debts by restrkting Ükir hnfxjns and expanding tlwzir experts 
threatened ta hmme advert cooseqt^iMa for Aii^fkan^ cxpcm hahtttrks. A 
comkkmNe |»aportioit of US. oqxms went to tl» tkvetoiAig vtorkL In 19®B, 
An^ri^n expmk to the Third DwakI ^counted for 23% aS thenr total eaqpofte.^ 
(bte in three twrres of US. agricahwal taiKl à  dewtW to exports, WtWt antounts to 
40% of US. agricultural production.^* The manufacturing industry, amounting to 
two thirds of Anwrican experts, wnt 39% of its pod  «arts to the Third wofld in 
19m^
Export industries are an important tourne of jobs for Antotkan laboureia. 
In IWi2 exports 8%ountcd for five miDioo Amerkan jobs, one out erf every
eight in the manufocturh^ inthstiy.*^ On avera^  it b «tinmted tJmt ft» 
every $! biliion mcrease in Amerkan reports, 24,000 jobs arc cnmted.*®
Amencai»’ fears over tte  impct of the debt crtss on their «port atto kbour 
markets «ere realized within a yrar of the M«tkan {^ments crtsis. Amerkan 
exports to seven of the largot dekt» imtions (ketined fiom $34 bSlfon in 1%1 to $18 
btOton in I%3, amotmdng to nearfy half the t t^ l  d^Iine in UJS. export during






that period^ Between 1980 and 1%5 American trade with Latin American fell 
by 30.6%, creating a lose of 632,OCX) jobs by 1985.^ FurthertmHe, another 930,01X1 
fewf tost w } ^  wmito have been created had LDCs’ growth treml of the 
1970's e m tin i^  aftor
T k  fx^nt»} poUt^l and ectmcaiuc comeqiarnci» of the debt crisis convinced 
major CTcdhor natiom tW  in twrfcr to p ro t^  their interests and tk*c of their hanks, 
it was necessary to unite in the pursuit of a common strategy for stabilizing UK’s’ 
debts.
Since the US. ^wemment and banks Imd the imsi to ktse from stwcrei^ 
defaults they assumed responsibility for the creation and implementation of a plan 
to stabilize Third world debts. The Unites States was and still s  considered by the 
majority of Western govenuTRtnts and banking officials to Iw the ideal candidate fw 
tfm pmdtion of toadmhtp. It has the diptomatk skill and management expcrtse to 
g iâk  rem^cdadons and tt% }K>hticai and fhmndai ctout to etrforce them. 
A m eren t^nks bore the greatest fii^ttdal ccposure to the largest tkbtors, Mexico,
^  U a ^  StttBS.Q»^FCts.K<»se.CoamnUtt: on Bankiagfimrw Urban AiTairs.Subcuimmttee 
oa lotcrnatiooal DevtJopmeot Institutions, FIcancc. Trade and Mowtary Policy. March 12,1KI9,% 
1986:10
^  United SWcs.Hoac.CoRgrcss.Committce on Banking, Finance and Urban Alfsm. 




Brmal and Ar^ntina, ami (o were cxpccW by Europeam, Oit»dkua ami 
hankers to take control of debt rencgotkitwns. As a result, the bank advisory 
committees that represent the interests of all creditor banks during debt 
rencgoliaiions are always chaired by an American hanker and the majority of the 
committee members are Americans.'*  ̂ There are generally one or two Europeans 
or Canadians on these committees, with one offrciai from the Bank of Tokyo 
representing the interest of the Japanese banks,^^
The Germans and British supported American leadership in order to protect 
their own financial interests. German and British banks had substantial deposits with 
the major U.S. creditor banks.*  ̂ So they were reluctant to obstruct the Americans’ 
debt nranagemcnt strategy since it protected their U.S. deposits. The Europeans, 
Japanese and Canadians were also unwilling to challenge US. leadership in the areas 
of international finance and Latin American relations, since both were considered to 
he tiaditkrnal areas of American influence. Latin America was outside the expertise 
of the Europeans, Canadians and Japanese, so they naturally looked to the U ^ . for 
guiikincc and leadership in stabilizing Latin America’s debts. The Europeans were 
primarily interested in Eastern Europe’s external debts, while the Japanese concerned 
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CHAPTER 3: THE POUTICAL RESPONSE TO
THE DEBT CRISIS; THE BAKER 
AND BRADY f lA S S
Within one year of Mexico's payments crisis the United States government and 
major American creditor banks had. with the full suppirt of the r.urofvans. 
Canadians and Japanese, positioned themscKes to assume full leadership in the 
«tnuiinntent of Third worU (kbts. This cmkamur involved the combined temtership 
of the White House, State Department, U.S, Treasury and the U,S. Federal Reserve. 
Tt^etber, these b o d ^  in coisultatkm with other creditor ^wcmnurnts and iltc 
mterrmtœml banlo, ctevéed a set of priorities that have since Income the guiding 
princtpis for tlw West's strategic response to the debt crisis. These principles are 
as follows:
ctebu»' countries must expand their export aial 6 b t servicing 
c^m bS^s m cgàei to servke their extent! debts. Indmttrial nations 
must contribute to this expansion by improving their own leveb of 
growth m$d redtKtx% prrneetkmsm
to growth, tkbtor nations miat undergo economic rehums.
These refrnim mwt include the prhmtrzation of public enterprises. 
iiKroBKd and foreign investment, trade liheralirtatton and the
mhsetms of nnpcsts
to AnW the Komnmc growth timi is required to service and eventually 
le th ^  ext^iml debts, deWor country need a continuity suppdy of 
esderrml fhmncW resourtxs &<nn commercW banks and i^tctai 
ageiœæs
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Wcaiem naîk>m vicwtd this last p im ipk, ilw suppfy trf external credits, as the 
key to achieving the successful impkmentatmn the strategy for a ttain ing  
iniematkinal tkhts. New bank kram were partkuWly important in this matter. 
C'tMTumrrcial credit was expected to facilitate capital fbrmatkm ami eccnusn^ growth 
in iJX 's . while lessening the adverse effects of structural adjustments. An increase 
in shon-ierm ktndii^ wouW hnamre tl% dif^ult transition to a mwc e x te n t  am) 
market-orkntcd economy and ensure that f o r e ^  currency was availabk: to purchase 
the injHits rteceaaty for the increased jMoductkm of oqtorts. Muhfyear 
commitments of commercial financing would Msêi in underwritii^ t(% n%dium and 
long term-structural adjustment prt^rams necessary for a return to h%her eamomk 
growth. In addition, new lending by commercial banks would promote tte  itih ^ ty  
of :he hanks’ Third world assets by allowing for debts to be se rv ed  in a timely 
manner.
The U.S. Trcasuiy eaqxcied dite cot«cqucnces if tire tanks halted ta th  short 
and medium-term leitding to the Third warkl. They foresaw countrres beh% forced 
to re^ on then own httemal sawing* and capital flows from oÉ&dal arurces, neWtcr 
of which couW finan» LDCs' neetkd ecomrmk refonm. Internatiorml Snamtal 
i r ^ u tb i»  were not ex p ^ ed  to wiHin^ %%ept the role of perpetiml sui^Ker trf new 
crnllt to indebted LDCs, esp«rm% d it rcstdted in a (kr^erom ^ h ^  k%el of 
ex]resure to urstablc Third wwld debtors. Tire Treasury Departmem did nm want
25
Amerkan tax |^^rs kft wiih ik: re$pœsiWlity uf out the IMF
World Bank.
Desire tîw Treasury Department's warnings, few banks were atnvinced to 
ÜKreffîce tbek fending to iiufetned Thtrd work) eountika. Many of the small regkrmi) 
banks viewed the provisioning of new capital or even the refînaneing of old sovereign 
debts as "throwing good money after bad". Even the major international banks, 
though pubHcly committed to their Third world borrowers, privately voiced concern 
over the LDC’s increasing inability to service their debts.
Bankers' growing antifmthy towards the debtor countrfes threatened to 
seriously decrease the amount of private lending to developing countries and 
undermine the West’s efforts to impose a framework for the stahiiization of 
international debts. In response to this predicament, the Americans dev&ed a 
proposal that w«3ukJ combine the West’s strategic objective of increttsing the level of 
î»ivate comnwrcial fendii^ to LlXTs, with the need to ensure the financial integrity 
of the intentional tanklt^ community. This plan came to k; called the Baker Plan.
• n œ  BAKER HJVN
The Baker Pkn first announced before ti% joint annual nKctit% cd tl%
IMF and üvi Workl Bank on O c tt^ r 8 ,19^  h  Stæul, &nith Korea, T te Pbn
not a forma! %t of gukkima, but ratlxr a seras trf kiteas that tl» AnKiian
administration hoped would l«  voJuntarity adopted Iqr ^btors aœl creditors. 71%
Plan’s 0%) bask principles were as follows:
debtor countrks shtntkl strive for ^nuii% eouKimk adju^tnenfô <wer 
the nWium to kmg terra and direct their economk poikies kjwartfe 
tkvetopn%nt
the top prrârity in ecoiuxmk K^ustment pn^raim should be ti% 
reduction of smte intervemrâs in the economy, prcmtotkn W market 
nœchanén^ priraie initatives and fmeign direct mvestntent
Baker expected these goals to be achieved withm the context of an ejqiaisran 
if lending to indebted countries. To encourage this Baker called for private and 
multilatéral lending institutions to provide $29 billion in loans to devckrpmg countries 
over a three year period. The Goran%icia! tmnks would proved S20 biOion and the 
World Bank and inter-American Bank for Development. $9 billion. These funds 
were to be alk%ated to tl% 15 OKst t%avily indebted countrks. These countries, call 
i!% "Baker 15", inclmkd Arj^otina, feazfl, Mexko, Vcneztœfet, U n^tt^ , Chik, 
Ecw^of, Cokmdria, Peru, Bohvta ami the M^ippinK.
Tf% pn^ro^l attempted to »ldr»s smte of tlte &cn%s that wvre
impniii^ tlw ftow o f cmnmercml loans to the TMrd world- The fim of these wm i1k
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uocertainQr over debion' economic siatHii^ ami tl%ir resuitant cap;ictty to scrvuv 
then' ex»n»I tkhts. Attention was foctsed tm tte  mkklk-tncinne de^-chipii^ 
counnies ctf Latin An%rica sùkc tteir excessive reign debts pn«ed a vet) scrams 
tlveat to the intenrational tKtnfcn  ̂«nmnuniiy. W ^em  observes »eie dertressed 
that, despite some economic gains in 1983, many Latin American debtors were slili 
undergoing a severe économie crisis I list weakened their ability to attract pnvate 
commercial lending. By 1984 general commodity prices were at an unprecedented 
low level The dollar prices for non-oil primary commodities were aNiui 11% lower 
in I%4 than in 1980. Oil prices, the lifeblood of the Mexican and Venezuelan 
economies, dropped 16.6% between 1981 and 1985. Furthermore many developing 
countries were plagued by high inflation and slow growth. In Utiin America inflalàm 
more than doubled between 1981 and 1984, averaging 117% in 1984, Meanwhile, 
rising interest rates intensified debtors’ struggles to service their debts. As of early 
I%6 interest rates were 6% higher than inflation, making the cost of servicing debts 
extremely high in real terms.
Baker ihonght he could solve debtors' economic problems as well as their 
failure to attract new commercial credits by calling for private and official financing 
to the Baker 15 countries to be tied to their implémentation and maintenance of 
sound economic adjustment programs.'*  ̂ He believed that increased lending to
^  Jama Baker. "The Baker Inilialive’. Pcdro-Pobto Kuczyaski (ed.). Baltimore. Maryland John 
Hopkins University Press, 1988:212
2H
(kNw wumnes wtmW on^ take {dace %W*re a <»tmtfy had '^ea&mat^ {mNpccs" 
A* «HNmmk growth.^ TkMe&Ne, I» caW  wpm imerna^nal Gnai%W 
institutmm, stKh m  the Wmkt Bank and IMF, m reiœw their e&ms to enforce 
WaiKc fd* {^ments adju»n»nts in debrcr ctrcntrks.^ Urc IMF was aqpectsd to 
incTMB* hs krnfo^ in suj^xat tte  ado{dkm <d n a rk t - (» k n ^  eamomk 
policfes.^ White the WorkI Bank’s W-dWrnmng iendii^ to suppon ÿ^wth» 
oftented polio» ami imtitutfomd and rccun^ rehmm was to be expanded so as to 
serve as a "ca ta^  for ccanmerciaJ bank temlmg",^
Baker vms conviiKol that tankers' reluctance to tetui to tW uebtw om ntr^  
woufo disappear tmce eanmmk reform polktes were mtroducKi ami countrks were 
a t^  to {sn^mriy servBX then «eternal debts.® 'n^rcfore, he set a gml of JS) 
WIkm in increased piWte tending to th«e countrks over the three years foîkwnç 
the announcement of this plan,
The rcoJixJ major td»tacte to increasif^ private to LDCs was dm
ksue of equal bunkn sharing. The intematicmai creditor Wnkt ba&ed at dm kkm
Baker 211 
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WbeËgtW af mm lo UXTs. n%y üeli that tte  Hnawwl
tmnfen wid mks of rntnicttmng LDOs* deb& sIkh^  be dmred equaJfy ami%% ail 
creâHc»’ banks ami cMBkW finamâal mstHutkm Large «wak kmimg becoming tmi 
rWy to te  a tte m p t an increasii^ «nas mmAer of banks. Since î%2. iMitlâfr 
banks ted  b^un a stearfy witinlrawat from ikbi reiKgotetion pacteges mal Third 
wmrki «  a For an U 5. tenks repcniü^ on rte tetknd Reserves'
X'ountry Exposure Lending Survey", exposure to the Baker 15 countries declined 
frcMD 136% of rapha! in June of to 54% in December of By 1 ^
private kncbag to LDCs had stagnated, with the rate of new lending he;i% 
considerably below the 5-7% annual increase called for by the IMF and Bank for 
In^rnabonal Settkmenis. The only eruption to this was the mulii-billkm dollar 
crmUt lockages organhæd umler the aispiœs of the IMF and involving primarily the 
credtUn' banks. Low Schirano, Senior Vice President of First Interstate Bank 
LhL, sp(*e for nm ^ r ^ m a l  bankers «ten he said outter tenks cuuhi no longer 
penatee their steretK^tes su|^xmii^ tumnind ecommiies within the Third world 
with increased extensions of credit.^ He a bo stated that it was unwise to
^  Edwin Trmnan. *UA Policy on the Prc^lems of teematkmal DeW" FEDERAL RBSteKVl 
m n j j n r o  N ow ^w r, 1989:731
^  U i^ d  S u ^s.0 ^ iesaJb 3 ise . Cmnratee oa Bankmg, Rrmnœ and Udwn 
tm teemaknW Devdk^»Knt Imtitutkn^ Ftsance, Tr%k ate
R #? . TIHRD T O Ü D  r a a r  L B C ^A IS M  D.C: Covema^i PiAhe^kms
OB&e, Feteaay 4 md Msish 9 .196&38
%
f^nkdpate in (kin Fem;gcniaf jam (mckagm when intematkHrai km)w^ was m  
an tinporuini of nrany regkmaJ tanks’ overall bieii»» nraa%y.^
JanfR» Batef felt tfat tk: probtem of «pml burden shaiir^ oouW be m lv^ by 
suppkntenting fmvate kndi*% with oRkwl kndh%. He su^ested ü a i of&kl 
insthutkms esiab&h fodlhks to support comn%rem! knding to the ckbtor em nitr^ 
He iRopoanl that tte  World Bank guarant» b propcntktn cS die fnindpk that wm 
due tcnvaitb the eW of the ban’s maturiQ? dak. The guarantee to ap{% to («% 
principle and mrt interest. Bankers would obtain this guarantee by paying a fee. The 
added com of whkh %vouW be compcmated for the increased fnotuibility tl»t the 
kw i woukJ mn fall into default.
Baker a to  sug^ted  timt the WorW Bank eqmnd iü co-6nascing (^ratiom  
in onkr to “iiKtrease the effectiveness of the Bank in helping its bofKjwers to attract 
pmaic finatmng".^^ These co4i*mncing oprraikms albwed «Jtimterda] banks m 
participate with the Work! Bank in symlicated bam, or to p in  tlw WorW Bank in 
offering a fkmting rate credit with a kvel {K^roent^. If interest rates on these 
k%ras shouW iiKxeme the World Bank would re^nance ary outstaraUng priitct}^ at 
tiK etW of tfw nmtimiy cbfc, thm emuring tW timcfy Krvkiog trf debts. Co*
^  ÎB1D 
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i arc k»»a, BsuaSy to sore thai 1 bâBoo, to a borrower &tns
a commAan «rfbmikk
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loam oflfcr bankers a poiential advantage in that (he officiai financial 
cmmsunity Ë com&krh% hnposii^ a rate whereby any k^n from t k  WorkI Bank he 
KTvk^d and rc;aW before all others, re^rdtess of their senkmty. Therefine, in the 
r*ar hiture Wnks w ot^ starW a far ̂ a t e r  chajKc of having tl^ir kvins servked ami 
repaid if they co-finaiKC them with the World Bank rather than commerciiil banks.
%jbtr bmt efftms, hs pton prwed unworkahte for the majority of 
(teb&* »xm trte aiW wm r e ^ e d  tnaiqf of the comn^rebl banks. Mmt of the 
Baker 15 countries failed to perform economically in a manner that was consistent 
with the tenant of the Baker Plan. White (here had been some inipnncnwnJ in (heir 
current mxmmt balaoas, their umteriyii^ ttemesiic poltews were not consistent^ 
thrmed towartb free'S^rket rcfbrn». There were often tong delays in negotiating 
staWhzation aitel structural mfjustmeni prt^ran» with ilK IMF aiW World Bank and 
when programs were agreed to governments frequency failed to meet their 
commitments. Many of these countries resorted to arrears on their external debt 
{mytiKtx#, ratlMf than tKgotmtc srrui^inents that woukl (%rmii ilw servicing of their 
co^racttm) d>%attmis. %  1987 the Baker 15 countrtes had accumulated an 
e t i n ^ d  $4,6 bilhon in htterat a r ^ r s  to comn^reml kinks.
TI» arrears on mterest, mwpted whb LDCs’ ecmutmic instability only 
nmiy b«dcers resolve w whWraw from tte  reiructuring LDCs 
external ddrts. TW sMre tsf lank ttebt in tl% Baker 15 countrtes fell fmm 67% in
32
!%2 ta 56% by the em! of 1%^ wfeft! the diare of IMF and muhte»re] 
(kvek)]W%nt banks' mf»e than tkwAW durh% thk perbd, from 7% to 18%.^
In It» (Ke dtkHms* inab#y to theb ami immy W atan
refusal to kmd new h k » ^ , Wawm mnhns, kad ty  tlm UjS^ were foimt to 
recoméder the debt man^cn»mt strategy m  embodkd hi t*» Baker Fkn. WMt was 
neetkd was a new plan itiai vrouki respond to It» realities of the Third worW teWh^ 
market, white stiU maintaining a commitment to ccotmmte refonm and inoemed 
private temfir^ to debtw countrtes. After much eomuha^^n with œdîtm s aiai 
(tebtofs, 11»  U5. (tevüed the Brady Plan.
NichoW Bratfy, St^retaiy of the U& Treasuiy uWer ti» Bush admimanration, 
presented his plan on March 1 0 , at a conferena on Third world debt sfmnsoied 
N  the Brookings fj^itute and the Bretton Woods Committee.
^  UiAed Steles. Commhtee.House.CdaB^tee m  ^ ^ e  W  Uib»  ASjdn.
SuhcnmmklfK on International Devek>pm.«it. Ftancg. Trade and Vfafietafv Potkv. THIRD %^)&LD 
C ^T ; HfBLK:REACÎ^TQîlffiBjkAPYPLAM.W astâB^D.C; O am m em  hdf&adom 
CWke. 1989:69
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TOB BRADY H jW
Tte Pkm a & d  for irnerratkmat efforte to be fooaed on achieving 
more rapid and brcmdiy h^sed debt reductions in order to improve LDCs’ praspecis 
for strong economic growth. Brady acknowledged in his pian the continuing need 
for new lending from the private sector, while bSso placing stronger emphasis on new 
investment flows and the repatriation of capital flight The IMF arrd World Bank 
were to play a major role by encouraging debtors’ economic policy reforms and 
cataUzing external financial support. The Brady Plan called for a redirection and 
increase of IMF and World Bank resources towards programs designed to support 
debt and debt service reduction IratKactictns that had been agreed upon by the 
commercial banks ami debtor nations,
Brady’s new strategy resembled Baker’s in that one of its central goals was to 
increase or at least maintain the level of private tending to LDCs. To achieve thss 
the Bmdy Flan had to surmount the two obstacles that continued to plague American 
efesrts to increase commercial iemling to the LDC’s; the failure of economic 
adjustments in debtor countries and the continuing withdrawal of banks from the 
Third world lending market.
In order to solve these two problems, high level officials in the U.S. first had 
to admit that LDCs' ttebt overhang was a serkn» impediment to their economic 
reforms and was eroding the ccoiwmk gains that had been achieved in the late
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197Ch> amj earfy 3%0's. &tween eraJ real per capita bcome decHffi»i in 
ahscilute icfim in mWmmi eveiy cotmtry m Smith A s te r ^ ^  Many cmmtries Svii^ 
stamiarUs ha% faJten in kvel of the ]95CTs atW 196(̂ s. lUal in Mexkx)
tkcUnoJ about 50% between 1%0 ami 1%8, w h^ tevmment m am* Latin
America as a whole all but collapsed.^ The Americans currfrontcd this problem 
fy calling for economic reforms to be combined with debt reductkms. In 1989 
Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, David C  Mulford, stated before the UJS. 
('<ingress that there wuuki have to be an easing of LDCs’ debt burden in order to 
bring about sustained growth in debtor countries, especially in Latin America.^ 
He said that negotiated reductions in debt and debt service burdens must be coupled 
With new lending in order to stabilize debtors' economies and enable the ordcrfy and 
timely servicing of their external dcbts.^’
Brady believed debt and debt service reductions due to u belief that they 
would lead to a renewal of economic growth in LDCs and the orderly and timely 
servicing of external debts. In addition, he expected that a decrease in LDCs’ debt
Jeffrey Sachs, "Making The Brady Plan Work’ FOREIGN AFFAmS. Summer, 1989:93 
^  IBID
^  United State*. Cb0grc».Houtc. Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs. 
Subcommittee on Intcmalioflal Development liadtutiotg. Finance, Trade and Monetary Policy. 




overianf wotdd mm in LDCs, tte  repairmAm mpkal and
an incn^K b  tbe flow i%w mmmercbd c a ^ l  to the debkw countrW
The BrWy Pten nppimed the iKcd Iw debt rethKtbm by cwoum^ng il^ 
IbeiaUzatbB ctf debt RKhedu&% that ordiim notMMts
iiKTC^ thek fCKi^ulh% of bterest as weU as prindpte on ofTkial dehis. Thw 
uakxa  wouM, htdhectfy, ;m*hk r»w mo%y and nKire lelkf than honks 
rc^ziKdo&^s. CttMhWr mthms were a&m calkd upon to imnease their ise of Muhi- 
^ a r  lUsdsethdii^ Agreci^nts (MYRA) durii^ the rei^oiiotkim of Third worW 
tkbts.^ TNse agreenvnis wnihJ ease a countiy’s «kbl kxtd am? < jM^rve its 
fo re ^  re«nno plac% a on tbe intérêt payments of external debts and 
e%tendh% tl» re{^m»nt perkxJ of tin; ton. In mkSition, debtor counties coukl 
hm:go etmly reiKgotktkm fe& ami produce nune accurate plans for medium- 
term ecomm^ tkveb^mxnL T k  Brady P to  arranged for ikht reduction nxasures 
to be sui^torted by tin tnhskm of i»w capita] bom the industriaitzed world. The 
Japane» ̂ rvemoœns wmt the onm ̂ iw o w  in this r^pect It agreed to ^ovide SIO 
bÜ&m to «qqxm of the g*atto% packages scheduled for Mexico, Cmia Ricn,
I arc agreements between crcdiion and debtors to renew 
a ddx ro ^ m W to  K Use ttow* b s  futtffled certain comhtiom. to tbh cæe the
B^toiwtce <̂  ■ «racnari Kj^utttBoa prcyam.
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Venexueta aw) the AW, tte  A m a km  g emment, through tM
Unhcd Slates Agency for IntcmalfonaJ Devetopmcni, pledged to provide coeccsstonaJ 
resw m a tn bc^h the PhBip^t»s am) Ctsia Rka in sujTpoit o f tWir deM atW (Wn 
servke reductions.^
TN; W (^  Bank end IMF were to omtnbste m LDCs’ debtt hy
redirecting iteh  resources to support debt am) WN serve» redeem s ^  the 
HwmwrcWi Imnks. Bratfy calted h» both instttutiom to provhk tkbt and debt Krvke 
reductions fumJtj^ as part of their polkyhose lending prc^rams.^ He s t r a t a )  
that a portkm tl^ »  policy-Wed bans he taed to fiance some debt rcdtKWo 
n»asures, siarh (» the bi^rback of lank debt and the purchase of colbteral for (kbt 
am) debt service redwtbn instruments am) the provision of Kmitm) interest support 
hv sm:h imtrumeitts.^ Hou%vcr, Bratfy stipukitm) that the»; Gnancml am ^ssbns 
should onfy be matte avaflabte to tht»e countries who were umiergoii^ strwtuml 
WhBtnxnt mtemustered by the IMF or Work) Bar*.
^  IWmd &mes.Om#caa.Hmac.CWuaittee on BaWmig Hmmce and UrW  Aitrin. 
Suhosœiâiee cm lateraadcH^ Deiek^^^m Imiiiutions. Rmume. TrWe am) htewtmy ftâkf. 
THIRD PEprSTRATpOY. Washmgtoo. D.C: Gowmnmnt Pubhraijom Of&c,
21. 1990:2)
*’* IWD
^  Niekdm feaite.T>eaB^ WUh the hmmmtkurn) Debt Crisk'JÆPARTNEVr OF STATE 
B u u in %  Mi^. im-S5
**’ Br*fy20
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The cofiunerml banks were the las! and imwt hmtUe audience that OraiH 
fmtxd in Mt e#KU to ÜKttæe kndii^ U) intkbied Third wnrHi cmunnes. The U.S. 
Treasury was quite open instating that the Brady Plan was designed in Ttarness 
commercial banks willingness to engage in debt and debt servke reductions for the 
beKfit erf iMrfw ocwntrfes*'.®’ n%am of achkving th» w;« tn adttpt his
ptan 10 tlw reah t^  trf the Third world fending market. This required ptopttsing the 
we of cdt n%chaosms as a oKam for the small and medium sized hanks to withdraw 
from (telH redtedutiitgs in a œntrolkd aiul structured manner. In making this 
(kdskm, %ady was iwponding to the overall trend of banks to reduce their exposure 
to Third world countries. Between 1986 and 1991) American bank provisions against 
tfurir (te^kipii^ country kxms rose from a minuscule 5^r in PÆ6 to an aveiagc of 
50% in Jutw of 1990.^ In Britain, during the same perrod, they rose l:om o-Hi'.i 
to 52-84%, Ckamai^ 35-70% to 50-78% and in Japan from y.l to 
Bairfcs fuitlwr rcduœd tl%k espi»ure through the uju; of exit mechanisms such 
e  <fcbt-fbr<quity swajs and llw selling of Third wiirld loans on the secondary 
omrkct. On average die miw la r ^ t  Anurrican banks, most ot whrmi earned
^  ftm ^rioas w  #o«a4im rcaerwai ate llmse fumb a Wnk sets asitk in rœ rves to cover any 
"  See tbs WORLD DEBT TABLB. mAlshcd by tbe WorW Bank.
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MAwaotml Thifd k»m, rWiKaR* tk;ir exposure to the Baker 15 country from 
201% in 1986 to 92% in 1990.
Bratfy suggested the me three mechanisim fw ckbt tediKtiom; exit bomfe, 
buyhack trf kmm Wih m h  and debt-frn-equity s##ps.^ A debtor coimtjy can gel 
an exit faiml exehangi% its bank Itmns for bma6 wfakh have a rcdiKW pnma;^ 
nodAtr interest rate. Essentially the b i ^  exchanges a b i^ rb k , high-return «set for 
a kmr-risk, kmr-rctufn oi«. Tlw purchases, being the debtor country, benefits 
avukling costfy debt rencgotiatwns aiwl Itwcring its debt ovcrlang.
Debt buyhack are when a debtor country btrys back its own debt, thus fining 
the full and immediate benefits of the secondary market price for its sovereign 
itebi.^’
Debt-for-cquJty swaps are transactions in which a potential investor buys 
country debt on the sccondaiy market awl then trattes it in at the debtor's central 
banks for local curremy which is then used fw an equity investment. A Wnk o n  
exchange its Third *wkl deWs in a similar manner ly? selling its Third uwW toans 
to an investor at a secowtaiy CMrket price. The inv^tw Oien cWtes tMm hi for 
inveaiwni capita! at the tfobtm cmmtty's central Imnk.
^  Sba&ptibtoL-Goâ^Beytmd tbe Bradÿ Pisa'. Q1A U JES$SW A i# si,VoIS ; 19^44
ScmnitMyiaafaetii tbe hacro^kmdioarto for tteseah^erfTbâd world Tbemruket
price for th; (kW « tte«Tsswd ty tbe tWiWr's perceived to Ktviee the kwo.
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Whik pkn ^^zommodated those banks wanting to withdraw from
ThW world km lk^ H s #  nm k provisbts for imneash^ temJing from tk«e hanks 
Braify hoped wtmtd continue to kml to tlw Third wor hi He stated Nfore the 
Bretton Woods conference that he expected the hanks to "remain interested in 
provWh% OMmey atul provkfo "diverse, actwe ami timely suppwi" in wtfcr to 
fodKtate tl*  rqaynKOt of ommKrekl bank kmns,^ Wtmt Brmfy ^entiahy want 
was for the nmjor creditor tanks to kml new oipttal to the debtor countries tlmi 
economic adj^tmcnts amid tw financed and interest payments sustained.
Brady attem{^d to achieve this objective by including in his Plan a brortder 
ran^  trfalternative for fimianaUy supptming commercial JemJir^ to UX”s than bml 
been previously offered by the Baker Pkn.^ These altcnuiitves included, in 
atklitkm to (kbt arW debt serviced reduction, s{^üii purpose loans such as trade 
crmlits aial projets, club bans by a groufs of hanks and new lending that involved 
re-kndh^ a portkm of tl% intérêt due on the exiting kuin7‘* Through the use ot 
tlKK fomneW mnwatfots atW pntKtpk and interest rate rcdmrtkms, the U.S. 






Q ^ ^ tte e  on R m ^e anf U rf^ Af&ûs. &dMMmmitiee on totemaikmat
Development lasdtutioas, Fisance, Trade and M jnetary Policy. 1989; 11 and Mike fa her."The Shaping 
<rf the B r #  P ro p o ^ ' m S R in jJm N  V(A21. NoZ 1990:19
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ÜN! banks would cut about $70 WBW for Ü» $340 biOkm owed to tl»m tg? the 39 
countries sktcd as tmMklstes for tlK Bnufy Ptait.^
TMBrat^ Plan was iwtwHk^Mce^ed within il%f%nk6%œmmut%. Maiy 
bankers strong  prattled Brady's sug^stkm  of ombrnn^ (kbt rahKtmn whfa i»w 
tendii^toUXTs. &»ne(^&itain'smoa emportant bankers :K cuscdB f8(^(^'% ^ 
in a dream world” aW one top Canadian bankers »id that the BrWy p ro p e l was 
"baakû^ umter the influente of nmrijuais".^ Many (rf the ram-UJS. I«mks are 
ckarfy biased agaimt the s i^ ^ tio n  of new tendtng to the cklrior «mntries. Uns 
pan^ refkcts their concern over ttebtors’ economies amJ a reloctam» to enlarge tWir 
kîan kiss rraerves to cover any new tending.^ In mkhtkm, they fear that 
forgiveiK^ miuld set an unwekooK precedent for hitute negottattom with debtor 
countries.^ The m a ^  ctedito> tmnio worried tMt the Brady proposal wmiM 
create a "frce-rkter" problem because of its reliance on voJuntaty debt reductkm. A 
fiee-fHter pr#*em occurs the partial extn^uâhmg of a cotatoy’s «werôgn (kbt
strengthen tk; valw of other banks' Third world k^n portfolios and (kcreases their 
incentive to pirtkipatc in futvae dent tesch^ulin^. T1» potential fim a hw-rider
^  Andrew.'Sm^mg Tmvards Anpwmc*' Ih^lfivjtM^iAL WVBS'fOR. May.




pohm vs m e  of the main weaknesses of t)% Bnufy Pbn. It did not provWe 
fw a negator w t^gama tkbt reductkm in ti» itK»t efl^ient nrnnner pissihk,
^  to cjsyre that aD oommercW aW creditors shared equalfy in tiur reduction 
erf (kvcloptng anmtiws^s external debts.
Despite these criticisms the Brady Plan was an improve ment over the Baker 
t^ui. It Iwl far greater ptnentW to stabUize debtcns’ ecommiies ami ttr king them 
hetk into the virfuntary fending market, Hmvcvcr, its central, beit^ a reliaiwe on 
banks vohmtaiy jmnicipatkm in debt reductions, precluded its acceptance by ik  
bankii% community. Very few banks wiflingfy accepted the klea of debt reduction and 
even few were Ukety to partkrtfxite in swh an endeavor, especially within the 
European amJ Canadân linking communitka.
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CHAPTER 4: THE STABILIZING INFLUENCE 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND
What Uitte suc£^ II» Baker aid Brady plam bW in eitcoura^^ tankers to 
increase or ma in ram their level of tending to indebted Third worW countries was due, 
in part, to the intervention of multilateral lending institutions, particularly the 
Intemaikmal Mtoetaiy Fund. Siiarc !he begmnii^ of the debt o^es the IMF ta» 
imtituted a number of innovations ttait have been instrumental in emurii^ that tl» 
flow of [vivate loan capital lo ilw Third work! was maintained. T1» Find 
iKcompI'shed this through three means; increasing the amount of avaSabk eamomk 
aid fiimiKial ihita on tkbior country  enfandng LDCs' creditworthiness imposing 
cunditkinuiiti^ and enforcing debtor countries' medfum'term coimnitnant to 
economic reforms.
Tte IMF has, siœx 1^2, skKxrately altered hs œumiy reports in onter to 
make fhem of more assistance to commercial banks in their evaluating of the risks 
involved in leidii^ to ik W r o n m tr^  Bankers cah the proœss of evaJimtkm 
country risk a ta ^ » . Country r»k anai^^B, w  CKA, consms of judÿh% tta rsks 
associated with investing within a gwen country aid invdv^ ana^%ing at^ nadoial 
OT intersstdtiat obstacles to a oruntiy's tin%ÿ servkh^ t^ its erctamal kons. Swh 
otatiurtes cover a whk array of eanmrnk, sOTâal or p t^ tkd  forces, such as mtOTKt
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rate e s te n t  (tebt fwe%n ecchange amrrtiK haUtitix ly
f^m teote de&nts, pcÆtkal dm uptm m  naiura! dkastera.
Previous to 1^2, CRA was a poor^ defined discipline that was accorded little 
afteinkHt within tW IntMnatmW baWdr^ community. Few attempts wvre mode to 
improve rnformatkm resources and so country risk was often assessed on a hire 
mhmnum of knowk»^ WWt Worma&m the tanks dkl have was often inaccurate 
dtte to tlte detibeiate alteratkin or otscuring Wrts and sutisiks hy bomwii^ 
o n m tr^  aW the genuine slmncomings in mformaiion gaiherir^ in nuist Third world 
emntrtes. Maiqt ttes^topii^ countries used inadequate sampling technk^ues to 
uteasaie such figures as GNP and ocports amS int]X)ns and ji»t as many maintairted 
cmfy \3gite figura on their level trf sovereign ttebt. Consequently, bankers were 
unabte to devi% precise medium-term economic and Hnancial prttjccitons on tlteir 
borrtw^rs and kjcouW not accurate^ asess countries' ability to service foreign debts 
over the ntedUim-term.
Cmoftoundi^ boniteis' attempts to natiuiK’ debt servicing ahilittes was 
t k  ai acoifBte tkta on mvere%rK' external rtehts. Some countries’ hank
sMreey ktws w  n^uWkms prevent^ t»nk5 from releasing information on their 
custcmteTS ami inechtt^  natkmal bank supervises from divu%ing to inher 
sypmviny autltefh^ Wmnmttoa whteh they had acquired in the course of their 
d u t ^  As a result, tankers lent btimily to countries that were already heavily
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WetAal aiKl «cmki be peiikiusfy d a »  to tkfauh if 8 nmjor dWiiptkm ocoined b  
the «xRxmgf or mtcmatioW &mocW ^siem.
TM tack of information ta» eoemal ddas was orty matte war» by ilw shtst* 
comings within tiw Information pmvnted muMtateral ii»titut»m. Ute Bank for 
Intcmatfonal Setttements pubhshes tjtmrterly and semi-aaniffil reports on bank 
tenihf^ to varfous coutnrks, but became of the tfoK tag betw%n ttata coltectfon ami 
puMkatktn, tlK informât km is often out of date four to e%bt montlm. L&ewtae, 
the World Bank's WorkI Debt Tables, which can be outdated by as much as two 
years. The country repwts that the WorW Bank compiles are for its own use and 
mn readita mmitahte to ouiskte ^ ro e s .
The Oganizatkm for &onomk Cooperation and Devefo|m»nt provktes 
annually in their rejsKt, "Ejocntal Itebts of Developing Countrto”, a compretensive 
list of public aiKi private debts outstamiing. But, l&c tl% WorW Bank’s data, k knot 
unusual for ttere to be two years between the coltecâm erf data ami its pubhcatknt 
in tl% OECD’s report.
The International Monetary Fund jnxsjuces a monthly report called, 
"Intermtfor»] FInatwtal Statktks" which ittctnporates regutar ctata on member 
Kmtttrtes’ WaiKc pim ents atW and foreign e » M t^  rc » n %  White tl^ »  
aatktics are an important data *mrcc for the tssks tf*y rqneented a mmH 
pcvtkm of t)% cmintry ctata that tW FufW was w#t% to ptbfoh in the y»rs 
fneced»^ tl» ctefo c r ^  The IMFs trmhtion of oottfktentta% with tta menfoer
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countries and ü»  need to protect a country’s bargaining position during negtttkitktns 
for sew kmtm, OKeaAaKd a dmant iclatkMahip with comim^cia] Wnk*.
ffisttfo frc»n its pubi^tfom ami press rek^es, it tod mi formal 
agiteoKnt to stoic Wtmmikm with autekk orpiüzatfom, repntoss of the 
cco^m ^ or fo^cW  mm of the nsnfoer cotmtiy.^ Tto shortcomii^ in 
bankeis' O lA  b ra ise  of inwmatiowl impmtam* wton Mexico annouwed Hs 
payments difficulties in 1%2. Western governments, especially the United States, 
became intent tm seeing that new and more accurate country data was mark 
avatobk to LDCs’ cmhtors. They feared that if the infommtmn was not 
forttoomh^ tonks woukf ovcnstimate LDG’ tkbt ^rvking problems ami witklraw 
total^ from tto TTurd worW lending market.
Since it was the American banks that were expected to he at tto forefront of 
kmiing to d^nor countries it w«t ttoir government, umfer Ronald Reagan, that 
look the initiative in calling for the freer exchange of amntry inforrruitum. In May 
1%3 it p3»ed tto Bretum Woods Agrceimmts Act Amendim;nts. Ths act 
#iputoW ttot tto "Ftmd sbmikl stfo]» nmxssaiy and appropriate nRusures to emure 
ttoi OKHc compkte ami tm^fy firmnciaj informatnm" to  motk: avaflahk Tto
^  f o #  S Mettoan. TBB V % LD  Cm  
Phaaddpha, tomoylvanoia, Robert Mon», 1983:65
^  (W k , N. &OMT and James & HwfodL SOVERHOH S W E R ^ N : RBCENT 
RH3ULATORY ANDLENPmO ISSUES A NDPRACTK ^ Phitok^ia, Pcmeytomito Rrtort 
hfoiTfe.l983:57
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U.S. Executive Director at the Fund was instructed, as part of the Act. to initiate 
discussions with other Fund directors on the adoption of new procedures designed 
to "dtsscminate publicty" information garnered in the course of Fund analysis.®* 
This would provide an enhanced informational base upon which international 
borrowing and tending decisions could be madc,®  ̂ Furthermore the Executive 
Director was to propose to the Fund’s other executive directors that the Fund 
intensity its examination of tbe trend and volume of the external indebtedness of 
private and public borrowers within member countries.®^
The American banks joined their government in calling for the IMF to be 
more liberal in its datsemination of sensitive country data. An number of bankers 
derrumdcd that the IMF provide more data about borrowing countries to the 
hanks.^ Rimmcr dc Vries, Senior Vice-President of Morgan Guaranty Trust, 
argued that the Fund could help the international lending market by providing the 
country data ami infnmatkm tl»t was e ternal to tonkers' «sessment of credit risk 
and tlK making of sound toam,® Other Wnkers went ftrnher by callii^ for the
Brower and Hurlock 58
« IBID
Brower god HurUxk 67
^  Lawrence Rout. "Some Commercial Bonks Press the IMF To Provide Data on Borrowing 
Na,kins' WALL ST. JOURNAL. April 1. 1983:16
® Richard J. Herring, MAWAOINO INTERNATIONAL RISK. Cambrkt^c. Engtsml: Univenhy 
of Pennsyh'annia Press, 1982:183
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Fmâ Ui tet krM&% «m em m tr^ as of thcir structural aUjtnimem
fTOgrana and eitabüih mechanisms hy which bankers could be warned of impending 
to ttotoor couîiiftos,*® Karen Lssakers viewed the IMF as the "natural 
one" to re%  wam«%s to tbe commencial banls,^
mUKlBY DATA
BANKING ACTIVITY
In H^t of (toclintog activity in (Iw Third wtrkl kmling market and tire 
denmmk of the An«rkan tmnks ami ^svemn^nt. the IMF had little choice hut to 
etq^ml its atmÿsâ of country data ami wklen the pool of institutions receiving this 
ioformatton. Oiw of the Grst shortcoming in country data ih.it it addressed was hank 
activity. In 1%4 the Fund initiated an or^mizcd system for immitoring international 
Imnkiiç activity. It b c ^  t&cussions with the teading bankers of certain countries 
about tl% rqpona) firms of prhute impital Ixtween creditor hanks and ifohior 
natkH».^ In the same ytar tW FmW introduced, in its "Im^rimtkmal Financial 
StotWe", tntentattoraJ bankû% s ta tic s  that osæssed the external fi.iNlities and 
assets of tbe tmski^ system of each member country. Thk torormuinin provides an
Ro«16 
^  IBID
^  Paul Memm: THE FUND. OmMMEROAL BANKS AND MEMBER O^JNTRIFS. 
Warintghm, DC: Irmrnnlm^ h&mamy Baal. 1984:25
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«itemive dataMse for the measuiii^ and stm^shig of intermtkmal bankii^ a^fvity. 
Ifs ttmeiiiwss » emuned ^  the W  Uwt there are onîy three rmsnths between the 
adlecibfl ami ptddkatmn df data. To aehkve a h%h tevc! of aocwraqf thè 
information é  comjmred to ml»;r data member cotmtrà» ami itttenm-
tâmaJ Imnkif^ «intre.*’  The Futd has aiatfc these staüstks mort emnprdKtahe 
integratà^ them with other data wunæt, indtaJing the WorW Bank’s T ^ k o r 
Rejxming %sicm\ which comprises infornwikm on public and pubhcfy gtmranteml 
kHîg'term sovereign debt ami the OECD’s mfbmmtion on sovcre^re’ ol&ial 
devekipment assistance and guaranteed export credits.^
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL COUNTRY DATA
TÏW second mformational p p  in CRA that the IMF confronted was tlat erf 
IÏW ecoimmk ami fmatKtal status of member countries. In I%4 the Fund intrtxlutæd 
into it staff repents tm devek^rfng onintries two innovatmns that ««re its fust step m 
bromlemng tte scope ami wxmacy erf its cot«rage of countries' economic am! 
financial activitks. The first of these innovation was the tmrluskm of information <m 
il« countiy's reiathrm with the World Bank, at times t^ u d ii^  the Bank’s ̂ ^ m te n t
^  HasamaW Mcbmi.EXT1ERNAL DEFT MANAOEMENTWashh^tondlC.: loterfiatkHud 
Momaajy Fund. 1983:166
^  lotermimmal Monctny FuM. "FwW  ̂OanpW m trf Im ena^W  Bank ^  AM m 
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c i tbe coimtiy's tnmuium  ot prc^rara and cHher ptdtcy stmlicd
by the BaidL^  ̂ SexmW, w » a revkw of tl% (tevek>fHneiu amî ehangw that
taken p ^ e  ht the country since its ksi cottsultatktn with the 
Fatrtkukr em^dw^ was bW %&essti  ̂ the countries' impkmentaikm of FunU- 
supportcd structurai adjustment prt^ratm.
Fumi*s abo began to pursue ckser ties with tM WorUI Hank. It m>w 
regubriy attends tt» lAWd Bank'k comuitative group nwetir^ ihttt are des%ned to 
promote aid fksws to indivklua! devcioping countries. At these meeting, the i'uml 
B Rspons&ie for provnhng an overvfew of country's maeroeconomk siiunikHi.*̂ ’ 
fat turn, the WorW l^nk provides assstancc to the IMF in jtuipng devcktping 
countrhs* (aiWic Kctor investnxot prt%rams, public emerprse ttperaiksns, pricing 
polkbs, tariff refcums, import überalôatmn and sectoral productivity amilysH.***
Fund surveiUan» atW teter, enMnced surveilknce pnwided the existing 
&an%wDrk for llw IMFs estabWritKnt of a more llutrot^h method trf investigatit^ 
member^ etanomk aiul GtmiKW statts and impmvii% the available information hase 
for the banks' employment of country risk analysis. Country surveillance consists of
^  UmaHanfRmA AMVtiA!. REPORT.Wahingum. DC.: InternatbmkiI Monetary
Fwat Mg&46




cofoultatkæs betwtæn FumJ mW ccHtntiy W&kb eveiy jpear ami a ba* m two yean, 
D«f% :be% are rmewtd n«mb^'g pdkWa and al) ami
statisikaJ iofunsatk» wpeet» of thek bakmc of paymook. Comuitatkmi are 
fulfcjwed evaJitttk)}» of tM effmrtivemess of tl» œwmy's cemmmk p c^ea  ntee 
tiu; W  ernsuHaimn ami advke k  giveo m met^Kn about Ikjw tW r p o ^ *  
be modtfied in ite cotnit^ year.
By ÜK mW to Wte 1%0's the IMF bcj^n to alter ibt counby RHvcilht^ fn 
ortfor lo nKci ils w%h;n)i% c^gatk}i» in the an^a of «nmtiy iteta WhKtkm. Tl» 
Executive ^m nl tkckfed that tlœ scope of surveillance wotmi be «qmmkti to itKlmk 
assessments of n^n^rs* th m ^ ie  Ktmomk pc^ks. Poml i^£f repents on r^ u k r 
sun^^amx swtukl imw provkk ^camtkl apprabab” M ecommik pt^tks
amJ ckarly outline the ana^hal W b  for these policks.^ Aho, the coverage of 
information notkes, muni to monitor kqr «kvetopnmnts that occurred betw%n reguter 
surveillance, was e n te r ^  in 1%7 to œvcragrMter range t^dtangesmthmmembm^ 
econotnks.^ Indkators wouki be empktyed to a a  as goidetincs m kkmifyn^ 
cxnunrks' ecomui^ ptdkks and to in detectii^ (kviatktns ùom ^ x ^ e d  
oKtluxb of stnanuml mljustn^nL^ Ecomnnk W kstors were expamkd bi
^  ktenuUKwml Hooeuay Tmâ, ANNUAL RCTCm*. W ahi^ton, D.Cj Imematkuia] 
Mmxtrny Amd.l98&a4
*  BID
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meœnm: em iœ m k peifoonancc, output growth, intlatton. unempkwincnt
Bid tJue b a k n a  jum ents , whik polky indicators now cosrted, among othtr 
t h ^ ,  mcnœiaiy yow tb and fàural defknts.^
T te  Fttml’s creation irf Enhanced smveiUanee was its second attempt to 
improve country data. Enhanced surveillance reports prinide vital country data (hat 
is not available except during regular surveillance periods. The reptrrts are prtduccJ 
in betwren stnveUknre perkxb and present a wkte array of indepth informai km on 
counkks’ AtaiKW situation, major macroeconomic objectives and economic reform 
fwîœks, These papers are supplemented Fund staff rejiorts «m the viabtliiy of 
the cmmtiy's stnœtural adjustment program.*^ Since enhanced surveillance, as well 
as sujveOlaiKa;, reports are now passed direct^ onto a country's commercial creditors. 
tl%y ^catfy enhanre t te  tanks' ability to accuraicfy judge a country’s debt servicing 
^pabflities and provkk a reliable database on which to make sound kndmg 
deckfons.**®
*  m m
99 ImeMWkW M t^W y FwkI  lEnhanced StaveSknce*. IMF Sl/RVEY. Scpicmher,
^  Isterem k^ hWetary Fimd. ANNUAL ptj^yOttT. WmdnngKm, D C: International 
FiuhI, 1987̂ 42.
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d ï:bt sT H u rru R F
Wiihin twi» years trf Mexico’s payments cris», the Fund began to adopt 
measures to improve its information on countries’ external debt structure- The first 
initiative in this area was the formattor, of a working group of multilateral itKtitutiomt 
charged with the task of collecting data on counUies’ external debts. The group, 
called the "International Compilers’ Working Group on External Debt Statistics", 
agreed in March of l%W to devek'p a common framework for external debts statistics 
and to explain to tN; public the concepts and covera^ of measure publisl^d by 
each organiziiiion.**** Among its objectives was to achieve the freer exchange of 
information on external debts between multilateral organizations and to publish 
annuatfy a report on each member countries' level of forei^ debt.^^ Most 
imfxirtanily for bankers was the group’s decision to concentrate it efforts on those 
liahilitir.s on which a contractual obligation to repay existed, thus covering aU 
sovereign debts to private b a n k s . U p o n  the conclusion of the meeting it was 
agreed that the Fund would begin to receive from the OECD mAmmatk)0 on 





would enable îbe Fuiui to publMi a more iteiaited breakdown of count nen' ewerna! 
debts.
The IMF further enhanced its information on countt\'& debt structure hv 
makH% a ^rcsbn in l%4 to itudiab in its surveillance re punis nunc "in-depth ami 
systemstk" information on countri»' debt î jsiiton.***̂  All consultatum reports on 
countries irmrlved in krfe-scak external borrowings wtrukl now contain a review am) 
analysé of the countiy's external debts and a technical projection on the country's 
ability to service its debts in the medium-ierra.'**  ̂ These technical prryectums 
provide t^nks and multikteral iietitutions with the proper Nrckground with which to 
jiKige member countries* ifcbt policies and debt servicing capabilities.
The Fund’s efforts toccunjwnsate for the shortcomings in bankers’CRA woukI 
have been of little consequence had it not abandoned its ojtee distant rekiiMinship 
with the commcrdal hanks. In 1%4 the Fund started to seek out more direct con­
tacts with commercial hanks. In most ct^es the purpose of tire se contacts was to gain 
a twüer im%ht into tte relatxrmhip between private creditors and sovereign debtors 
aiKl tte  capital fksws of jwticuiar countries, Less formal contacts Ire tween 




^  Menue 25
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bunk üRkmk ami the Fund's capital market s^c^lrsts, hcatb of departments or even 
t*K Maiming Director.*®*
By 1987 these casual arrangements proved incapable of satisfying the banks’ 
growing need for infonnatkin on debtor countrws’ eeonomk and Rnat%ial statiK. 
Consequent^, the Executive Board of tl» Fumi decided that with it auitorsation, 
stuff reptrts or todmdua] wuntiy (btu, mcluding coiKuftathm rc]»rts and papers 
pre^nting a number’s request for the use of Futtd resource could be released m 
creditor banks.Furtherm ore, the Executive Board made the ttedsksn fas 1991 
to allow imtitutions assisting member countries wnn economic reforms access to a 
wWer range of Fund country documents, but onfy on the condition that remained 
confRfcniiaL*
PONOnTOfAIIEY
As a result lyf the debt crisis the conditional}^ on Fund loans has taken mt 
unpreccifonted importaiure wttluD the intertmtionol banking ctmununfay. To tinkers, 
fomiitâmality hæ become an fanpwtant measure of a country’s creditworthfa^ss. If 
a anmtty s  imptemettting one of the Fund’s adjustment prc^rants bankers view it as
IBID
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a mené 8M»opna% candidate (or new temitng than a afuntry mn undt*r^>inp 
stn»nural æJjtatment.
Ftnai comHtkamHty Im% mdtkved this «taiiK becau% the esireme unix’nainty 
that has characterized Third world lending since 1982. The near default of some of 
the world’s largest sovereign debtors and the implications for the banking community 
convinced most bankers of the importance of having a standtndized forma; for 
judging a country’s creditworthiness. Such sentiments were the first of their kiml 
the ifltermitiona} kmkrng community. Prwr to sovereign creditworthine^ like 
CRA, 99S not given much attention by commercial bankers. There eskied a 
a rr^  of OKtkxk to nations' ability to servi» their debts. Some
ana^scs tried to trarWer the tetmnts of corporate creditworthiness to countries by 
aigimg tkat a country was insolvent onfy wten its real interest payments on foreign 
borrowii^ cweedal its national immme. A liquidity problem only arose when a 
ctHinoy was unal^ to obtain the foreign cxchun^ necessary to servicing external 
debts. Other bmkcrs iisktRl that one take mto account the country’s ptditioil 
stalely, dtwtenic econmok poUdes and willingness to service its debts. Some t«x;k 
a different ^p rœ eh  by st^estmg that e%%xctations on the profwr servicing of debt 
expended not so roiKh on the bcnrowers, as on the banks’ spreading the risk ol 
s o w r ^ i  ising symlkate It^tK, ^oj^phkally diversilymg lending and
whMrHwh^ toai» or at teast reducit^ banks’ exposure before debt servicing was 
interrupted.
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The careless nature of sovereign creditworthiness procedures changed almost 
overnight when Mexico announced its payments créis in 1^2. Bankers becan* 
convinced that debtor countries would have to adopt certain reforms measures if they 
were to be conskkred creditworthy am) e)%R^ for mmv k»m. In e^mcc these 
tefoitm became the new criteria for aswssit^ ^b to r country's creditworthiness.
The first of these criteria was the effkknt use trf iKw credit. It was ortretncîy 
important to the hanks that new money tent to indebted countries not be lost to 
cvHTuptkm, capital flight or unprtKÎucîtve ventures. Secondfy, tinkers wanted debtor 
countries to institute a seri^ trf neoclassical economic policies desigi%d to gamer the 
foreign capital wih whteh to setvtee external debts, L^tly, banker’s required 
assurances that countries would adhere to ttese economic reforms over the life of a 
medium-term Wn. usually 3-5 years. They fch that without a set of proper eojnomsc 
guidelines ttebtons’ balance of jmyments and foreign currency reserves wouki fluctuate 
and debt rervking mtuld become extremely unpredictable. Such a shuatkm would 
teave hankers veiy rcliKtant to tend debtor countries anythit^ but very skm-term 
kiam, if even that.
With these new criicrb in mind, lak e rs  Ixgan to look towards the Fund as 
the institution brat suited to ttevku^ and enforcing improvml statuterds erf 
credtivHutlmress in hutebred tteveloping counfoes. TT^ Fund was the onfy i ^ l  
camlkUite for th@ petition. Onfy it had tte political inSuence, technical exjrert^ and
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Baa MW rcKmrCM to cany out such a task and it already had in place a sv t̂em for 
tegalJy enforcing clmr^s within debtors’ economics, nan^ty, comlitiorejlity.
Conditionality, while it provided the basic framework for economic lelormx 
was too lenient to enforce the extensive economic changes demanded by the 
international financial community. So it became necessary for the Fund to increase 
the mape arsl enfomement of coruHtkmality in onkr to satéfy tkhiors' need fur 
eamomic refmms and tin; banks’ new, stricter stamhirds of sovereign 
œ tütw m ihm ^. The Fund achieved this by creating two new facilities, the StriKtuird 
Ar^ustmeni Facility and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility am) altering two 
exBtii^ faolhies, the Compensatory Financing Facility and the Extended Fund 
FadliQ?.
EFFICIENT USE OF NEW LENDING CAPITAL
The Fund empkyed a number of meares to meet tha bankers’ criteria for the 
elWeot iBC (rf new capita) in nwmber countries. The first of tf%se were the chants 
isatk to tJ» Competaatmy Rnancit^ Facility in (here after it will be called hy 
its pneent tatnc, the CbmpeMatoiy and Comin^ncy Financing Facility, or CC Ff'). 
The most in^xrrtant of t l^ e  w#s the mmxJuctkm of measures to strengtimn
Fural «mtjol over tjw efWeot use of ttw contin^ncy pan of the kmn. Now a limit 
m settolM  mmdmum amount of «xitii^M y funtb that can be disbursed in the ease 
of w^Bwurabfo external ckvehqmwtts which threaten a nation’s economic reforms.
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No fuiKb can be reteai^ untii ÜK IMF s  satbfied that the counwy u  making vmble 
pn^ess towards its eccmonty.^** The Fund has soie control over the
maximum amount of contingency fmaiKing that » available tiw rKtpicnt veers from 
its adjiKtincm program. In w k r  to enstme that the amount nmditknml futWit% 
rckÆKcd m nm excessive In rekitioQ to the member's ^ e tb  the Fuial hKlwha m 
CCFF agrccnwnts the stipulation that the amount trf coatingenty finamring be 
deiermitKd by the amount of t k  country's imlance of payments deficit in a ^ven 
j^ftod of
Equalfy strict measures have N;cn instituted by the Fund over the use irf 
umter tte  Stnœtural At^u^ment Facility. Smu^tural AdjiMriiKitt Facility, 
or SAF, toan agreements stipulate that the amount of fiindii^ supplied over the three 
j«ars of the agreement be determitKd before the raotKy is released, rather tlmn tm 
an annual basis.*T lx : annual rcle^ng of the financing s  onfy permitted tf the 
Fund appros^ tl% mender's efftais to adjist ami if tl% country can i^ove that 
tte moirey s  r«p!Û«l for faakmx of {^ynrente ass»tan«.**'* If iwither of these
Inicmationa! Monetary Fund. ANNUAL aFWHTTWashington. D.C: International 
MofwtMy Amd. ldS9S6
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criteria are met than the Fund halts financing, reprdkss of its commismcns to a 
three year lending period.'
The use of Policy Framework Papers on SAF loans alkws the Fund even 
further control over the use of its credit. Policy framework papers are prepared by 
country members seeking to receive a SAF loon. These papers contain detailed 
descriptkms of the country’s major economic problems and prkwiiies, structural 
ftdju^nsnt p o l ^  and most importantly, cstimtes of its external fimindi^ needs and 
the w urea of such fundii^.*^* Polky frairwwork i^pcrs telp the Fund to mi » 
limit rat the si% its SAF kian a t^  awid a situation in which a sutkkn influx of 
excessive concessional financing leads to the inefficient use of capital and the 
wakening of a country's structural adjiBtmeni pn%ram.
Fmui UKl^tors arc another ckck on a country’s use of IMF hums. Indicators 
evaluate the efficacy of a member's economic reforms by assessing them against a 
witte r a r ^  lA benchnmrks, mclWmg a owntiy’s tevel of indebtedrteais, mmbct of 
arrears, growth performance and recent and projected behaviour of current account 
r^ives.^*^ art ustalfy integrated mto tlw country reports of those
nations undergoing structural adjustments. These reports arc then made avniJabJe 
h> t*K œiffltiy’s auditors.
%BQ)




The IMF fc!t that tankers’ demands for economic reforms in debtor cotintrics 
could be met by the replacement of LDCs’ statist economic policies with frcc-raarket 
economic reforms designed to generate the foreign reserves with whkh to service 
external debts. These reforms hold out the promise that in an environment of global 
economic growth dcvekrping countries will be able to re-inv^ratc their economies 
through the privatizalion of inefficient government entcrpr^s, expansion of export 
industries and eventual return to a level of creditworthiness acceptable to the banking 
community. With these expectations in mind, IMF officials vigorously pursued the 
expansion of conditional lendings with the result that the vast majority of the financial 
disbursements since 1982 have had medium to high conditionalities on them.
The IMF achieved this high proportion of conditional lending through the 
alteration of its Contingency and Extended Fund facilities and the creation of the 
Structural Adjustment Facility and Extended Structural Adjustment Facility. The 
Extended Fund Facility, or EFF, was originaDy created in 1974 to assist member 
countrkrs in meeting external payments problems over a tongcr period and in larger 
amounts than were available under stand-by arrangements. In 1988 the Interim 
Committee of the Fund decided that increased EFF funding would only go to those 
members who were undergoing siroi^ adjustrocm efforts supported by the
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To nmke pabiabk to number coummrs the
CbmmhKc omcmkd ilw Hfc trf a EFF h»n from three to four years,**** Miclwl 
Oatmksaa, fcmt^r^ Director of tt»  Faml slated tMt wHh these e h a n ^
Ü» 0 ?  awdd b«xmK a mxre eSectke imtrun»nt for swpp)ftit% the KumTs 
wjgwstmcm pfograus fai owtAer countrks ami catalizh% otter sounds of fmaoeing 
fcs members, |» k a r%  asmtærcàJ credit.*^
The Compensatory and Con tinge trey Financing Facility underwent similar 
c t e r ^ .  It, in mkhthm to providing the traditional comr«n%aiion for shonfalh in 
txpcax n ^ p a  tff «K«%s in the {nkes of cereal imports, w»niid now provkk 
numbers with extra Gnancing, but only if ttey were alresufy pursuing sinw^ 
adjustmcni measures.*^* The Fund stated openly upon creating the C'CFF that 
it was now geared towards helping countries to maintain the momentum of their 
adjustment measures in the face of adverse external shocks.**'
The SAP and the ESAF were deliberately created for the purpose of propping 
^  econot^ reGmn p a t^ z ^  in (ktsor countries. Hie SAF, xkvek^xd in March of
*** taenaBiM^Mraai«yRa^*FuodtoLai^hE«cnffllConiiiigcftcyVfcchanHim; Revamp 
EFF 1MFSÜRVEY. Ajsd 18.198&118
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fntcr*^hma| M t^ ta y Rmd. The IMF: FKK% New Challen^: An Iniervkw with Michel 
Cmndena* PMAIKS AND I^V C T iM ia rr  W  1988J
latemsdonsl Mmetsiy Fund Tund'» General Resources Available to Members Under 
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1986, proviticj resources on conccsstonal lerms to only those low-income member 
cmmlfMS Urn a »  pm*TW«l babmx of paysteiHs m  a result ai
Wpkmcntkg a #n*cttmil «Ijutm^nt Its cA^t^ivea are to Ixlp
rntoAer c^umrto ataWWi *W coWhkms fw swtah%d g w th , itres^theo il%k 
babjtce of payments pmltkm mad fsdlitate o n k ^  retetim» «Htb 
Tlæ^ h»m are disbursed annually a tk %  y w  period, but ot% oxmbent can 
prmw iW  t l ^  are adhering U» tktir a^eed stn^uraj adpstment pnogram.^^ 
If the Fumi h^e% s that adjmtimtnt prograim Imve imt wwked and that cmrKtWe 
measures are i^cessaiy, t!% prt^ram wiU be alierW and reinforced during the i%%i 
annual review procès,
The ESaF resembles h prettecessor, tl% SAF, in its c^ctives, c% W ty and 
bosk p n ^ m  fesimes. Where it dtffns 5 m tiK fetcistiy of the fnovWom it 
to force members to adhere to their agreed structural adjustment program. 
Recipient ESAF bans tmm not on^ d e s ^  a |»]ky Framework paper and a 
tbmited anmml proyam, but also umbips Fumi surveillât^ throughout thx tW e 
year life of tlK agreetwnt. Thb smvc#MKc onshus of qwrter^ bewhmarka, semi*
Intonations hksjetey Jnind "EnktKcd StavefliaaKe* IMF SURVEY. Sqnendi^ 1989t2
Intcroaliona] Monetary FundXbmpematoiy and Cominjeccy Fmaising He^s Members 
A 4»t w Eswrml %ocks" IMF SURVEY. ^%uat 1989:12
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affinal repom aM in nxHt CBse%, m W ^ r  revkwr.*^ CtntmricK
rtcefvkf Uaae ksam are expecied to be cnfmrit% oi^ustmem eOivtR aimed 
at fostering growth and achieving a substaniialJy strengthened ha in nee of payments 
pcË6m%.*^ BMawe the stroi^ at^mttn^m imt^unes that are enpibk umkr 
the ESAF the Executive Board of the Fund decided in 1990 that counthcs should he 
etmwa#ed m im^nons «oirantbtg support "%s eor^ as pt^iNe".*^ 
In this way the IMF has a far greater opportunity to monitor the track record and 
^ n A cr 's  ad^tatnam noasures dan if the country was umkr a SAF
Itan*^
COMMITMENT TO STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENTS
Fund oSkiflls are aware that bankers view the agreement to adopt economic 
reforms as only the first move in a debtor country’s return to creditworthiness. A 
second and more important step é  the country’s medium to long-term commitment 
to tlffise fc&^tis. In ortkr to t^tkve ths cnierâ tW Fund ht» integrated into 
CCFF, SAF sffii ESAF ^reeoook  oW itfo»  whkh are tksigned to monitor the
iXî fa^iMtioaal hfoiKiaiy Fumk 'Btbaixed Wwt&uMæ' IMF SURVEY. Septeikxr. t9N%2
*® nan
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enfmcemejii of a «Himi/s commiiow» m stnKturai over the mecUum-
lerm.
Tl% SAF ami HSAF both tan three to Awr years, v*kh cc&u^i» with the 
banks’ perception of a medium-icrm fending period. The SAF and ESAF both 
employ the use of benchmarks. Structural benchmarks address key structural 
pihcics, white financial bcnchireirks arc employed every three months to measure 
monciary, fiscal and external debt variables,*^’ Any deviations from these 
benchmarks would be token into account in assessing subsequent annual 
putgranis.*'^ Benchmarks help the Fund, as welt as creditors, to assess a 
countries' commitment to structural adjustments and if necessary, to reinforced these 
reforms over the life of the loon period.
In addition to having to meet certain benchmarks, countries receiving SAF and 
HSAF loons must also undergo a periodic assessments of their economic adjustments, 
annual surveiJJance reviews and in the case of the ESAF, semi-annual performance 
reviews and mid-year assessments.
The CCFF has no specified inonitcring techniques. Instead the Fund chose 
to leave the choice of monitoring techniques up to the discretion of the ofBdah 
responsible for constructing each three year CCFF loan agreement. The rules of 




IHodus» amdk ta»Ser coari^ncy RgmiKkg «ecthm of tho CtTF ure subjvci lo 
tltt dservan» BR^aWe }XTfonnaiice criteria" as is neccssaiy hy
FshkI
Monkwkg hrdmkpM» swh as smveilknce rep«% and pcrftmnanco rcvitnvs. 
help to reassure bankers that at least in the medium-term, cimnines' commitmeiit lo 
structural adjustments will be closely monitored and enforced by the IMF.
Despite the Fund’s accomplishments in bringing a heightened degree of order 
and stability to Third world lending, there arc still many areas if concern that have 
yet to be addressed. Bankers fear that structural adjustment programs may conflict 
with their needs and encourage debtors to seek medium to long-term ksans helore 
their economies are fuUy stabilized. Also, the very ability of structural adjustment 
programs to reform debtors* economics and generated increased foreign reserves bus 
been questioned by a number of analysts. Unfortunately it is impossible for the 
Fund, as a public institution, to respond fully to these and other concerns of private 
institutions such as banks. Bankers can only be assured of the full servicing of their 
toaat when both the tkvebped ami tkvebping wwWs return to a increased level of 
growth.
^  ÏBtenaüo»! FWuL ANNUAL REW»T. Washington. D.C: l>miÜ
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C U A F T m  & CONCLUSION
When Mexktj annuunced its payments crisis in 15^ mai^ feared that tte 
ensuing tfcbt crisis would bankrupt many of tiK bluest creditor imnk. Thà 
environment of uncertainty forced Western natktm ami their banks into an 
unprecedented allkince designed to enforce a debt management strategy that woufaJ 
minimise the risks to the creditor banks by ensuring an uninterrupted flow of debt 
piymcnts from the debtor countries to their creditor banks.
ITte Baker and Brady plans attempted to enforce this strategy overcoming 
the nujjor obstacles to continintd private lemiing to the debtor cmmttics. Baker 
believed that tying new lending to economic structural adjustiiKnts be could ease 
bankers* ' one rns over the interruption of ttebt servings due to LDG* economic 
instability. Baker sought to address the «sue of equal burden sharing by encouraging 
the IMF atni Workl Bank to join commercial banks in new lending to dcvclopinr 
countries. Brady faced the same problems as Baker, but t(X)k a more realistic 
apprtvich to their resolution. He perssicd in calling for the reftwm of debtors' 
economies, but recognized that principle and interest jmyments reductioiK w«rc a 
precursor to the stKcessful adjustment of debtors* Konomks. Bratfy arranged for 
reduction efforts to supported by the IMF, World Bank ami Anxrican and 
Japanese governments. He was convimed that by reducing UXüs’ debt overMi^
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ht couM pfon^e debtors' smatural reforms and reium ihem to an a(%epù)hk lew! 
of creditwoftbine» on the iniemaUonal lersling markeL
The IMF* roîe in Western management of the debt crisis has been to act as 
a stabiKzmg force. !t has netunKd wmc degree of normaky to Third wtrld kmhng 
aitd csm l^f*d a new set irf criteria fy which banks can amduci their knding to 
Third worU ommrks. Through its country data gathering efforts and the use ol 
comütkmaUty it has brought a greater degree of order ami stability to relations 
tetwecn tte  banks ami Third world sovereign Jeralers. Because of the Fund’s efforts 
to expand and improve the accuracy of its country data, hanks are mnv able to make 
respons&k lending decskrtK based on reasrmed analysis and not anxious s|%culation 
The IMFs country data b at prêtent the onfy readily available tkita base that vs 
cmsstcnt from country to country and comprchcnsiw enough to meet the neeth of 
the tanldi^ immunity. Fund condititHiality, in the form of structural adjust men; 
prt^ranB, piovKtes bankers with the first iniemationally recognized formate for 
asessing the crethtworthitie^ of Third worki borrowers. In addition, comiitkvnalities 
provKte the knding «rnimunity with at feast some assurance that their new moivey 
kmiB to UXTs win be used cfficfeniiy ami for economic adjustment that will provide 
for tlK seivfeit% extenrnl detes over the ntediwm-term.
The Wwt’s stKces^ul stabUmatkm of Third mrrld debts now affords both 
(Editors and debtors the opportunity to address the mt»t debilitating aspect of the
m
debt cm», UXia' tkbt cnrcrban^. No debtw countiy can make any substantial gains 
ünvards economk; griwtb until their external debts arc reduced.
Efcbt reductions need no toiler be viewed a threat to the créditer banks. 
The hanks are now in position to ateorb substantial on their Third wcn'kl kare 
without any risk to their continuing operatkms or arfwettcy. Since 1%9 US. moiKy- 
centred banks have had, on average, 30% of their Third world loans covered by loans 
k«s reserves, while in Euroj», banks have 90-100% erf their Third wwkl portfolio 
covered 1^ tteir reserves.*^ Selling off pan of their Third world portfolio would 
not lower the value of banks’ remaining toans since the value of the market has 
already recognized their value. In 1989 the sccondaiy market price for Mexioo's 
^b ts  was .40 cents on the US. dollar, B re l’s, 32 œnts and Argentina's .18 
c e n t s . I n  addition, the banks have a moral obligation to take respomibflity for 
their overfcnding of the 1970's. Neither First or Third world taxpayers hav« an 
ohligatkin to bail out tlK banks for their bad Wans. Furthermore, future bankers may 
he more cautious in their lending if they arc fwced to accept responsibility for their 
jnevicHBfy irre^xmsa:^ teitdii^. Contrary to bankers' arguments, ttebt redKtkms 
offer them an important advantage. Debt reductions can improve the economic 
pcrformarKC of the debtor countries and iheretgr the ultimate value of tlwir creditors’ 
portfolkx They will akm end the unoertam^ arcsmd fan k ' Third wm-kl kmns ami
Jeremy Main. "A Latin Debt Man That Might Work". FORTUNE. Ajwfl 2A 1989.258. 
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attow îlæ bâiüs to co&ct what payments they can whik dehim cmintncs :ire still ahle 
to KTvtK their tkbts. A number of tanks haw begun to recognize the value debt 
redianicn. Tlw Anwrkan Express Bank unveikii in u plan for massne tieht 
writc-ofe the comn^rcia] banks and relief fw debtor countries.*^ TT* plan 
suggested t}»t t^tks seH off their Third work) debt to an intemaiktna! debt facility 
at tiw current Komdary market prke, whkh %muld be on average cents on the 
American d o l l a r . T h e  Bank believes that if devektping countries were fonvd 
to service their full debts, their ability to pay w^mld seriously deteriorate and the 
wltK (rf kmk-held debts wouki fall to as low as .25 cents or .31 cents on tire 
Arwrkan tfcjllar.*^
The Japane% haw Wen fmrtkulai^ strong supporters of dclrt reduction for 
tte dewloptng world. They arc eager to settle Latin America's debt problems so that 
they can expand their export markets into this area and become a major source ol 
HHïin^crâî capital to the Latin Americans,’'’*̂ Japanese luinkers are ikvw 
to jnessure their ^jvemments into giving them larger tax breaks lor 
severe^  kmm that b%n written down.'**
Jeffrey S^ta. TW Debt Crsis at a Turning Point". OlAIJJHNfilÿ MayTune, l‘>SS:22.
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Debt mluctkms sbouW be imtiiuted M of tbe World &ink or IMFs 
structural adjiemnent pn^rams. This wouki pmved the institwUomI Kttmg i^ t^ a ty  
for overcoming firec-rkfer prtAkm. T l^ c  deN redwtkms m at be i^}iiated 
through comfxehemivc a^ecments bctwKO all w  nmst of a country's offîc»! aM 
private creditors. 'ÏTiis wouki ensue that the writedown rkbts s  slured evei^ 
atma^ all creditors, both official and private. Debt reductmts shoukl be of a size 
that allows debtors to forego future debt reschedulings and return them to an 
acce^Wc iewl of soverei^ creditworthiiKm. TTtere dtouW be strrct 
condjliui'ialilies on debt reductions. It makes little sense to reduce the level of LDCs 
debts if the money sased is not used wecfy and resporesibiy towards rebuilding 
deNors' economics and reversing tl% <h terioraiion in the living staiK^n^ of the poor 
and mkklle cbss.
However, debt reductions do not crffer the final solutkm. tfebtw countries will 
never fulfy recover from tlwir j»ymcnts c tsk  unkss there is a renewal of economic 
growth in the imhistirâlœed workJ. Until thé hapfwis afl that delmris and creditors 
can do is to mit%ate tW consequences of the cris» and eimire that ttebmrs’ are in 
a position to quiddy ezptott any renewal of growth in the indi»trmUzal vwrrid.
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